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Abstract
The paper outlines the problem of aviation jet propulsion in the interwar period and World
War II and analyses Soviet progress towards a solution using newly available archival
documentation. Soviet R&D commitments were influenced by long–term security motivations
and the need to invest in local tacit knowledge. The scale and diversity of the Soviet R&D
effort is described. The allocation of resources resulted from R&D agents’ horizontally
organised market–like interactions within a vertically organised command system. Financing
decisions were made in a context of asymmetric information, adverse selection, and
opportunism. Overall funding was rationed; budget constraints on individual projects were
soft, but were periodically hardened. In addition to decisions to finance and refinance or
terminate projects, takeovers and mergers took place in a secondary asset market. There is
evidence of rent–seeking activity, but where rent–seeking was detected it was punished.
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Introduction
This paper is about the allocation of resources to military research and development
(R&D) in a command system. In whose interests were Soviet military resources
allocated? Four approaches to this question may be considered. First, a longstanding
and authoritative literature suggests that the allocation of resources responded
primarily to high–level commands, and that the latter reflected national missions
driven by perceptions of external threats. For example, the classic works of Joseph
Berliner and David Holloway emphasised the role of national security considerations
in driving mission–oriented research in the defence sector.1
Other approaches may also be considered. A second approach is derived from
“proprietorial” theories of dictatorship, exemplified by the work of Mancur Olson.
These imply that an all–powerful dictator would have allocated military technological
resources in such a way as to maximise the security of his tax revenues.2 A third
approach is inspired by the literature on rent–seeking in bureaucratic systems; it
suggests that we should look more closely for opportunistic behaviour on the part of
domestic low–level R&D agents who may have exploited asymmetries in the
distribution of information in order to extract rents.3 Finally, in the spirit of Ronald
Wintrobe’s analysis of the trading of rents for loyalty in a political market place, we
should ask whether there really was a national R&D mission that was first designed in
relation to external threats, followed by rent–seeking that fed itself upon the national
mission; or whether it was rent–seeking that came first and the national mission was
designed to distribute domestic rents in return for domestic loyalty.4 From these
various standpoints military R&D may be analysed as both a public and a private
good.
Defence R&D under Dictatorship and Democracy
What do these four approaches predict about the allocation of resources? Consider
defence outlays in general. The outcome of the pure national–mission model is
straightforward. Defence is a public good. A social–welfare maximising government
facing a given threat should allocate resources to military outlays of all kinds until the
expected social return equals the cost to society at the margin. However, it is not clear
that governments actually do this anywhere in the world. 5
Consider defence outlays in a dictatorship and a democracy. Michelle Garfinkel
has argued that incumbent policy–makers in competitive political systems have an
incentive to underinvest in national security in the face of a given threat, because the
likelihood of being replaced in the short–term by another policy–maker with different
goals prevents the incumbent from fully internalising the long–term benefits.6 Given
that threats are not actually given but are determined by interaction between states,
                                                
1 Berliner (1976); Holloway (1982a); Hanson and Pavitt (1987).
2 Olson (1993).
3 On secrecy and scientific fraud in military R&D see Park (2000), 189; on
opportunism in Soviet military R&D see Harrison (2001).
4 Wintrobe (1998).
5 For new research on the determinants of European defence expenditures in the
interwar period see Eloranta (2000) and (2001).
6 Garfinkel (1994).
2the outcome can be a good equilibrium of low military spending in regions where
democracies predominate. Garfinkel also shows empirically that democratic states
have tended to spend less on defence than nondemocratic ones.
A proprietorial dictator will make a calculation that differs in several respects
from that made by an elected governor. He, not society, bears the whole cost of
military outlays because they are a deduction from his rent. He shares in the public–
good return, that is the protection of society including his income from it, against
external threats. He expects to internalise his return over a longer period than an
electoral cycle. In addition to the public–good return that protects both society and the
dictator, military outlays provide the dictator with a purely private return: the army
will protect him against society. For these reasons the dictator will allocate resources
to military outlays until the long–run marginal social benefit, plus the dictator’s
marginal private benefit, equals the marginal cost. Finally, by engaging in military
competition the dictator may stimulate external threats; this can shift the regional
context towards a bad equilibrium of heightened insecurity, a higher public–good
return, and higher spending.
Now consider investments specifically in military R&D. The explicit motivation
of Soviet military R&D was to enhance national security in the future rather than the
present.7 That being the case we might expect investments in military R&D to
respond to approximately the same logic as defence consumption, but with two
differences. First, time matters more, and this promoted the incentive to invest in
military R&D. Time mattered to Stalin, who planned for the long term, and in fact
spent most of his life preparing for a future war; it is true that his planning horizon
shortened in the late 1930s, but this was because of the growing likelihood of war in
the present, not because of an electoral deadline.
The second difference was a disincentive, especially for a poor country. National
security is a public good but with a local domain: the sphere of its nonexcludable
benefits can be limited to the nation. In contrast R&D output spills over national
frontiers unless controlled by official secrecy. Secrets are hard to keep, and strategic
competitors can send spies to steal them. Such calculations suggest that a poor
country with strategic aspirations like the Soviet Union should have abstained from
domestic military R&D altogether and instead relied on exploiting spillovers from
richer countries by means of industrial espionage.8
However, the disincentive may be less than is often thought. R&D produces
knowledge that is only partly explicit; the rest is tacit.9 Only the explicit element of
knowledge is a pure public good with a global domain, with benefits that are
excludable through secrecy alone. The evidence suggests that tacit knowledge is
                                                
7 Standard western accounting definitions (e.g. Pryor, 1968) restrict defence
outlays to the pay and subsistence of military personnel, the procurement of weapons,
the cost of military operations (e.g. fuel and transport), and defence construction (e.g.
barracks, airfields, fortifications). All defence outlays are counted as government
consumption, even when they involve defence construction or additions to military
stockpiles. Other investments, including in military R&D, add to the productive
capacity of society and are counted as firms’ gross investment, not under defence. As
will become apparent below this differs somewhat from Soviet practice, under which
military R&D was paid partly by the army and partly by industry. On defence outlays
in Soviet and western national accounts see Harrison (1996), xxviii–xxix.
8 Some have argued that this is all we need to know about Soviet technology, e.g.
Keller (1960) and Sutton (1971).
9 On tacit knowledge see MacKenzie (1996), 215–16. Tacit knowledge is
recognised in economics as the result of “learning by doing” (e.g. Arrow, 1962). The
classic example of tacit knowledge is the understanding required to ride a bicycle.
3produced jointly with explicit knowledge and is complementary to it in use. Thus
explicit knowledge, although easily borrowed or stolen, is hard to exploit without
local tacit knowledge. To gain tacit knowledge requires investments in R&D so that
agents may “learn by doing”. Thus tacit knowledge enhances the excludability of
returns to investments in military R&D so long as the R&D agents themselves are
kept personally secure by restrictions on their travel and migration. While the Soviet
authorities made every possible use of R&D spillovers from the west, tacit knowledge
and its uses were at the core of their motives for investing in R&D at home.
Military R&D and the Distribution of Rents
Under any constitution the military budget may become a focus for rent–seekers, and
military R&D is well suited to this.10 The following factors make it so: military
secrecy; relatively soft budget constraints; intrinsic uncertainty about the timescale
and expected value of returns to investment that impede selection, including the
rational expectation that many projects will fail; and large information biases that
impede monitoring. Under these circumstances self–interested R&D agents can be
expected to invest resources in lobbying for initial funding or refinancing of their own
projects, and some of the resources they invest will be diverted from nominal
allocations to military R&D. In addition, their lobbying is designed to attract more
funding than an uncorrupted principal would have allocated to them. Thus rent–
seeking is a negative–sum game. The result is that military R&D will claim more
resources than would be allocated on a comparison of marginal revenues and costs
whether to society or to a dictator.
Finally, under any constitution the government may intentionally design its
military R&D or procurement system to dissipate rents in return for loyalty. Under
democratic arrangements the resulting outlays will exceed the efficient level for a
public good. The excess is the signal that loyalty is expected in return; if some waste
did not result, those receiving the funding would have no reason to offer thanks to the
government in exchange since any politician would rationally promise to undertake at
least those expenditures that were efficient.11 A dictator and his subjects will make a
similar calculation, only their criteria for efficiency will be private and are likely to be
less restrictive than in a democracy.
One way of differentiating between these four approaches is to consider the
significance of R&D failures. From the point of view of the national mission, or the
dictator’s interests, an R&D failure was simply part of the cost of success: some
experiments fail, and failed experiments are part of the necessary background against
which success is achieved. In contrast, from the point of view of rent–seeking R&D
agents, failure may well provide more (and more certain) revenue than success,
provided the costs of the agents’ failure are either shared with society or borne by the
dictator. Thus R&D failures may be a private good although a social bad. Finally, the
resources invested in R&D failures may be an unintended consequence of the
experimentation process, or they may be intended to compensate agents directly for
their loyalty.
                                                
10 Analysis on these lines is often traced back to US President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s parting warning (17 January 1961) to the American people against “the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–
industrial complex”. According to Holloway (1982a), 293, “A major assumption in
the argment that a powerful military–industrial complex dominates American policy
is that the United States has spent more than is necessary on defence”.
11 Wintrobe (1998), 31. Consider for example US President George W. Bush’s
commitment to implement the National Missile Defense programme alongside the
lobbying outlays and political contributions of Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and
Raytheon, all big contractors for NMD (Hartung and Ciarrocca, 2000).
4Is the allocation of Soviet R&D resources best described as taking place within a
hierarchy or a market? This may seem a strange question. A market is a network that
is organised horizontally and a hierarchy is a vertical network. In a standard work on
Soviet military innovation David Holloway wrote: “It is a characteristic feature of the
Soviet economy that vertical relationships predominate over horizontal ones; and this
is true of the defence sector too”.12 Even in rich market economies the market for
defence goods and services always involves significant vertical relationships of
unequal power because the government is a monopsonist. In market economies
defence contractors also enjoy non–market advantages over civilian suppliers and
competitors in nondefence markets because they can exploit relationships with
government that can be made exclusive and defended on grounds of national security
and secrecy. In the Soviet economy the government’s monopoly of capital funding,
credit, and material supply made hierarchy even more important.
In this paper, however, I deliberately emphasise “the market for inventions” in
order to lean against a literature that has tended to analyse the Soviet allocation of
R&D resources within a framework of exclusively vertical relationships of command
and monitoring. In a spirit similar to that of Eugène Zaleski’s idea of a sphere of
“regulated market economy” within Soviet planning, I will show that horizontal
relationships were surprisingly important to the allocation process.13 However, if the
reader is minded to protest that hierarchy was still at the core of the command system
and cannot possibly be omitted from the analysis I will be the first to agree.
This paper is in eight parts. Part 1 outlines the problem of jet propulsion facing
aviation inventors and designers in all countries in the interwar period. Part 2
describes the scale and diversity of the Soviet R&D effort in this field up to 1944.
Parts 3 and 4 identify the funding principals and the design agents, describe some of
the networks that bound them together, and find that designers had the advantage of
the first move. Parts 5 and 6 describe the transactions that arose from the long term
character of projects: decisions to refinance or not to refinance, and secondary asset
market transactions such as takeovers and mergers. Part 7 analyses the problem faced
by the funding principals in distinguishing between good and bad projects. Part 8
concludes.
1. The Problem of Jet Propulsion
The case through which I explore these issues is the Soviet effort in the field of
aviation jet propulsion. “Jet propulsion” or “jet reaction” covers the principle
underlying both rocket motors and jet engines: action and reaction are equal and
opposite. A rocket is just a jet that does not need to breathe air. For consistency one
might refer to the “air–jet” engine to distinguish it from the rocket type of jet, as the
Russians did in the 1930s: vozdushno–reaktivnaia dvigatel’. But I will call them just
jets and rockets. I begin in the dawn of the process in 1932, and I conclude in 1944
when it was apparent that the jet propulsion of aircraft was already an established
fact. I explore my topic through the documentary records of the defence industry held
by the Russian State Economics Archive (RGAE), supplemented by those of the Red
Army held by the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), with a few records also
held by the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), all in Moscow.
In the interwar period, the airscrew propeller driven by a reciprocating piston
engine reached its limits in terms of speed and altitude of aircraft performance.14 This
prompted intensive efforts in several countries to develop completely new types of
aeroengine based on a continuous thermal cycle giving rise to a jet reaction. Two
                                                
12 Holloway (1982a), 330.
13 Zaleski (1980), 490–2.
14 Grigor’ev (1994), 189.
5concepts competed, each of classic simplicity, but in each case their practical
realisation proved to be extraordinary difficult and complex. One was the rocket
motor and the other was the jet engine.
Small solid–fuelled rockets had been used for hundreds of years in many
countries for display and signals. A survey prepared in the ammunition commissariat
in 1939 reminds us that rockets were used for the first time in European warfare in the
Napoleonic wars, initially as an incendiary siege weapon, then as ammunition against
troops, and by the middle of the nineteenth century most armies carried substantial
stocks of rocket artillery. 15 Towards the twentieth century rifled artillery acquired a
significant advantage in accuracy and concentration of fire and rockets were little
used in World War I, but in the interwar period rocketry experienced a renaissance in
connection with new fuels and artillery uses. Aviation was exceptionally important as
a complementary development, since rockets could be used for both air–to–ground
and ground–to–air artillery.
Figure 1. The liquid–fuelled rocket motor
Source: RGAE, 8044/1/1182, 95. Labels are added. This and the drawings reproduced in
figures 2 to 4 were evidently prepared in the commissariat of the aircraft industry in 1944 to
accompany a briefing for Stalin by commissar A.I. Shakhurin and set of proposals on the
development of jet and rocket aircraft and aeroengines. The originals are coloured by hand.
In the 1930s rockets also began to be used in an entirely new way, as aviation
boosters. However, to create a primary aviation power plant would require a rocket
motor of unprecedented size and complexity, using more powerful liquid fuels (see
figure 1) with pressurised or pumped fuel delivery, and requiring substantial advances
in material and fuel sciences and control systems. In the interwar years the practical
gain from such an achievement remained speculative; because rocket fuel contained
its own combustion ingredients, rockets were understood to be capable of performing
at limitless altitudes but only for limited duration.
Figure 2. The turbojet
Source: RGAE, 8044/1/1182, 97. Labels are added.
The concept of the air–breathing jet engine was of much more recent origin. At
its simplest there was a hollow tube; provided the tube was already moving at high
                                                
15 RGAE, fond 7516, opis’ 1, delo  324, folios 6–11 (hereafter 7516/1/324, 6–11)
(no date but 1939). USSR ministries were called “People’s Commissariats” (here
commissariats for short) until March 1946.
oxidant oxidiser combustion exhaust
turbineair compression exhaustair inlet fuel injection combustion
6speed air would enter the tube at one end and be compressed (hence “ramjet”), after
which it was mixed with fuel and burnt; the exhaust gases left the other end of the
tube in a jet stream, driving the tube forward. The defect of the ramjet was that it
could not serve as a primary power plant because the aircraft had to be accelerated to
high speed before the ramjet could ignite. A primary power plant had to be able to
suck in and compress air when stationary. In Frank Whittle’s patent of 1930 this
function was to be met by a single moving part, a rotating spindle driving a
compressor at the front and driven by a turbine at the rear; combustion would take
place between the compressor and turbine, and the exhaust gases would drive the
turbine: hence, “turbojet”. Figure 2 shows an engine with an axial compressor of the
type developed in Germany during the war as distinct from the radial compressor
favoured by the early British turbojets.
As with interwar rocketry the practical gains from such a device lacked
experimental confirmation. Jets were understood in theory to be capable of higher
speeds at higher altitudes than airscrew engines, though not of space flight, and for
much longer duration than rockets. The concept of a gas turbine arose naturally from
existing applications of steam turbines, principally in electricity generation and
marine engineering.16 But to combine a jet engine with a gas turbocompressor
required developments in material and fuel sciences and control systems far beyond
the level of the time.
Expectations, both positive and negative, were very important. In each country
faith in the future of the turbojet, reinforced by the belief that rivals in other countries
were making equal or greater efforts, drove the R&D effort along a path of trial and
error. Final success made the turbojet a self–fulfilling prophecy. 17 But there were
many failures en route , and these were double–edged. With hindsight the failures
were a part of learning and a necessary cost of success. At the time, however, they
often fuelled scepticism and conservatism, as those involved sometimes recognised.
As an investigation into the faulty manufacture of parts for a Soviet prototype gas
turbine reported in 1938: “to start the engine in the form produced by the factory –– if
it were possible –– could only end in an accident and destroy the idea of building a
gas turbine at its very inception”.18
Scepticism was an obstacle everywhere. In Britain Whittle feared that each
mishap would destroy his funders’ faith in both himself and his engine.19 In the
United States the National Academy of Sciences reported negatively on the technical
feasibility of the turbojet in June 1940; this was a year after the first successful
though secret test flight of a Heinkel turbojet aircraft in Germany. 20 According to the
Soviet turbojet pioneer A.M. Liul’ka scepticism persisted in the Soviet Union until
the end of 1943.21 Even in Germany the scepticism evaporated only after the principle
                                                
16 Voronkov (1984), 115.
17 On the “technological trajectory” as a self–fulfilling prophecy see MacKenzie
(1996), 57.
18 RGAE, 8328/1/995, 111 (9 December 1938): emphasis added. The investigator
was the steam turbine designer A. Kozhevnikov, the prototype was an Uvarov design
(see table 1), and the manufacturer was the Kolomna engineering works.
19 E.g. Whittle (1953), 78.
20 A passage from the report reproduced by Golley (1987), facing page 114, bears
Whittle's handwritten comment: “Good thing I was too stupid to know this”.
21 Liul’ka and Kuvshinnikov (1981), 89.
7had been demonstrated in flight.22 But as we shall see it was also characteristic of
inventors to ascribe their difficulties to resistance by unbelievers.
Figure 3. The propjet
Source: RGAE, 8044/1/1182, 96. Labels are added.
Theory ran far ahead of what was technically practicable. For example, the
thermodynamic efficiency of the turbojet was already understood to be poor at low
speeds and altitudes, so a further development on the turbojet conceived well before it
could be implemented was the “propjet” (figure 3): the turbine drives not only the
compressor but also an airscrew propeller subject to reduction gearing, which
improves thermodynamic efficiency provided high speeds and altitudes are not
required. And between the turbojet and propjet lay the fanjet, or turbojet with a
bypass chamber, universally applied in modern jet airliners; a bypass engine was
patented by Liul’ka in April 1941.23
Figure 4. The hybrid jet engine with compressor
Source: RGAE, 8044/1/1182, 94. Labels are added.
A natural response to the great gap between theory and practice was to
compromise. To get around the fundamental difficulty of the turbocompressor, clever
and inventive people all over Europe were exploring a variety of intermediate steps
and hybrid solutions; the Soviet Union was only unusual in both pursuing a relatively
wide range of alternatives and finding little practical success in any.24 The simplest
stopgap was to place auxiliary ramjet boosters on an otherwise conventional aircraft,
                                                
22 Ermenc (1990), 8 (interview: Hans von Ohain) and 89 (Peter Kappus).
23 Liul’ka and Kuvshinnikov (1981), 91.
24 Surveys of Soviet interwar progress in this direction include Egorov (1994),
424–36; Serov (1997); and Gordon and Dexter (1999).
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8but this was also least satisfactory because the boosters added little extra speed and
resulted in considerable aerodynamic losses.
A more complex alternative, but still less demanding than the turbojet, was to
build a hybrid engine: a supercharged jet for which the compressor was driven by an
auxiliary piston engine rather than a gas turbine, enabling the jet engine to act as the
primary power plant. A hybrid engine of Soviet design is shown in figure 4: the
piston engine drives both a conventional airscrew and a compressor for a jet engine.
The aircraft shown looks like the experimental I–107/Su–5 tested in 1945.
There was also widespread interest in the refinement of existing steam turbine
technology as an alternative means of driving a conventional airscrew. If oil–fired
steam turbines had replaced the reciprocating engine at sea, then why not in the air as
well? Finally, there remained rocketry: if the turbojet remained impractical, then
rocket motors must be developed far beyond their existing limits. I include all these in
the scope of this paper.
From a mission standpoint, what were the appropriate responses to the extent of
technological uncertainty? The chances of progress could be enhanced mainly by an
open–ended commitment to advance on many fronts at the same time. Many
problems demanded simultaneous technological solutions. Many applications would
not be detected without free–ranging exploration of new technologies. The state had
to fund many projects, accepting a high probability of failure in any one project, in
order to ensure that at least some successful projects would be included. Failed
inventions were part of the costs of success.25
As far as the scale of effort is concerned, no government would accept a
completely open financial commitment, but there were different degrees of open–
handedness across countries. For each country the feasibility of a given commitment
varied with the economy’s size, development level, and mobilisation capacity. The
interwar British, German, and Soviet economies were of approximately similar size.
Britain and Germany were more developed in science and industry than the USSR,
but the Soviet economy was not without an advantage in its superior mobilisation
capacity. 26
2. Scale and Diversity
Table 1 provides an overview of Soviet R&D projects in jet propulsion and aviation
turbines from 1932 to 1944. It is compiled mainly from the plans, reports, and
memoranda of the commissariats of defence, internal affairs, heavy industry, the
defence industry, ammunition, and the aircraft industry, as shown in appendix A. The
table is organised by R&D establishment, and is somewhat more complete than the
narrative accounts supplied by previous authorities which have tended to focus on
famous designers such as Liul’ka and V.V. Uvarov; this led to a neglect of those
projects not associated with famous designers, or which ended in failure so that their
sponsors have preferred to forget about them.
The table shows that in the prewar years a dozen research establishments were
involved; these are detailed with their affiliations in appendix B. First among them,
the only one with a continuous commitment throughout the period under review, was
the body formed in January 1934 as RNII: the Jet Propulsion Research Institute.
RNII’s history is complex and turbulent.27 It underwent half a dozen changes of name
and/or affiliation in a dozen years; these are summarised in figure B–1. Many
establishments had no connection with the aircraft industry; for example, until the
war RNII was regarded principally as an artillery establishment, and some others
                                                
25 Mokyr (1990), 176–7.
26 Harrison (1998).
27 Harrison (2000), 127–30; Siddiqi (2000a), 1–14.
9Figure 5. Major Soviet R&D projects in jet propulsion and turbines for aviation,
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were affiliated to the energy sector. Table 1 also indicates that some long–standing
projects were nomadic; for example, in the interwar years Aksiutin’s and Uvarov’s
projects moved from one institute or bureau to another. There were also cases of
forced relocation by the NKVD (commissariat for internal affairs) such as those
involving the future chief designers of the Soviet Union S.P. Korolev and V.P.
Glushko. Finally, some establishments shared projects and designers. These mean
that the number of R&D establishments involved over a period of time tended to
exceed the number of designers and projects.
The time profile of the number of projects is illustrated in figure 5. It shows
significant growth, turnover, and fluctuations. There was a cycle in the number of
major projects in progress which peaked at eight at the beginning of 1938. In the
years 1932 to 1937 fifteen projects were initiated and seven terminated, leaving eight
continuing into 1938. In the latter year there was a sudden retrenchment: one new
project began while five were terminated. In the period from 1939 to the outbreak of
war in mid–1941 there was high turnover and some renewed expansion: a further six
projects were terminated but nine new ones took their place. As a result, at the
outbreak of war there was a new peak with seven projects in progress. In the first
critical six months of the war only one new project was initiated and six were
cancelled, so that at the beginning of 1942 the field of effort was at its most restricted
in more than ten years: only two projects continued. But in 1942 a new diffusion of
effort began with seven new projects beginning and only three further terminations
through 1944, leaving six major projects in progress at the closing date of the period
under review. Most important of the latter was Liul’ka’s TR–1, illustrated on the
cover page.
The spread of this cycle across establishments is also clear. The continuous core
of jet propulsion R&D was located in RNII–NII–3. Nearly all the expansion of
research up to 1938 involved a diffusion of effort to other establishments, mainly
those belonging to heavy industry and the Red Army. These projects were eliminated
in the two retrenchments of 1938 and 1941, leaving RNII–NII–3 alone in the field at
the beginning of 1942.
Table 2 compares the pattern of efforts in jet and turbine engineering with that in
aviation rocketry. It shows that jet and turbine projects accounted for most of the
activity and nearly all the volatility shown in figure 5. For example, they were seven
out of the eight projects continuing at the beginning of 1938 and also in mid–1941.
All of the terminations of 1938 and the second half of 1941 were jet and turbine
10
projects. In fact at the end of 1941 there were no jet or turbine projects in progress at
all, and there was a complete if temporary break until progress resumed in 1942.
Did this effort represent a significant commitment of national resources? On the
information available at present, the answer appears to be no: the entire business
amounted to little more than a cottage industry. A reasonable guess at the scale of a
typical project in the late 1930s would be half a million rubles a year, involving the
direct employment of five scientific workers and an additional handful of ancillary
staff. On the basis of an annual average wage for that period of 3000 rubles, half a
million rubles would also represent the direct–plus–indirect employment of 150 to
200 public–sector workers. If so, then the seven projects in progress at the peak of
interwar activity represented a maximum annual outlay of three to four million rubles
per year, the direct employment of 30 to 40 scientific workers, and the direct–plus–
indirect employment of perhaps 1000 public–sector employees.
In more detail, table 3 shows that RNII–NII–3, the most important organisation in
this field, employed roughly 400 staff in the mid–1930s and that this total had
doubled by the outbreak of war. Of course there was a very high proportion of
scientifically and technically qualified staff, including a couple of hundred
“engineering and technical employees”, perhaps roughly equivalent to the science
faculty of a small or medium university of that time. Table 4 presents the two main
rocketry establishments, RNII and its offshoot KB–7, in comparison with the other
research outfits of the ammunition industry in 1938. It shows that RNII remained
substantially larger than KB–7 in staffing, budget, and R&D profile. But even in
combination they represented little more than loose change. In 1938 the two largest
establishments in the industry, NII–24 (together with its Leningrad filial) and KB–47,
deployed 170 scientific workers, 355 research topics, and nearly 32 million rubles. By
another measure, the 57 scientific workers at RNII and KB–7 represented little more
than 0.5 per thousand of the scientific workers employed in the Soviet economy two
years later.28
The value of work done by RNII–NII–3 grew rapidly in the interwar period.
Between 1936 and 1939 it more than trebled, before coming to a sudden halt in 1940;
figures are as follows: 29
1936 3 377 thousand rubles
1937 plan 4 482 thousand rubles
1938 6 111 thousand rubles
1939 11 434 thousand rubles
1940 11 233 thousand rubles
Nominal stagnation in 1940 probably meant a substantial cut in real terms.30 Still,
considering general trends over the second half of the 1930s, these figures were rising
                                                
28 There were 98 300 “scientific workers” in the Soviet Union in 1940 according
to Goskomstat (1987), 64.
29 For 1936 and 1937 plan see appendix C. For 1938–9 see RGAE, 8162/1/240,
32 (13 January 1940), and for 1940 RGAE, 8162/1/449, 3 (14 January 1941). The
figure for 1940 that had been planned and approved by KO was slightly higher at
11 725 thousand rubles. However, towards the end of that year an investigation
uncovered that the responsible fourth chief administration of the commissariat of
aircraft production had illegally planned a much higher figure of 13 162 thousand
rubles; see RGAE, 7516/1/692, 3 (21 November 1940). No doubt this was followed
by hasty and perhaps severe cutbacks during December.
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faster than the Red Army’s overall procurement of military equipment. The latter,
however, was greater by several orders of magnitude.31
It is important to bear in mind, moreover, the greater part of the work done at
RNII–NII–3 was concerned with rocket artillery and had nothing to do with aviation.
Jet engineering and aviation rocketry accounted for just two fifths of the direct costs
of research and experimentation planned by RNII in 1937 (925 thousand rubles out of
2.3 millions).32 Subsequently, this proportion declined. For example, in the
preliminary allocations to the projects listed by NII–3 in its thematic plan for research
and experimentation in 1940, the proportion of aviation–related projects fell to less
than 6 per cent (700 out of 11 725 thousand rubles).33
Figures for outlays and personnel in wartime R&D for jet propulsion are lacking.
It is clear that the outbreak of war saw a sharp cutback followed by a degree of
recovery. By 1944 work on jet propulsion had assumed new urgency. The reason was
that jet and rocket aircraft with German markings had appeared in combat roles in the
skies over Europe. British jet aircraft were also entering service. The problems of
principle had been solved and the sceptics had been answered. The Soviet aircraft
industry was lagging behind, and it was now a practical matter of catching up with all
speed. However, it seems unlikely that the resources committed to jet propulsion
R&D in the war period up to May 1944 represented a significant advance on the
peacetime effort in the same direction.
The Soviet outlays appear trivial in comparison with the resources that Germany
devoted to the development of V–weapons. A postwar American estimate put the
total development costs of the jet–powered V–1 cruise missile at approximately $200
million in wartime US prices, and those of the V–2 rocket at ten times that amount, or
roughly the same as the $2 billion costs of developing the atomic bomb in the United
States.34 It seems unlikely that the total of Soviet resources invested in aviation jet
propulsion up to the end of 1944 exceeded $20 million on the same standard of
valuation.35
What limited Soviet outlays on jet propulsion R&D? For reasons that are
considered in more detail below, financial constraints on Soviet R&D projects were
soft. On a few occasions this was made explicit. At a meeting of the technical council
of the chief administration for the aircraft industry held in August 1936 to review the
development of a number of steam turbine projects, one of the designers present
reported: “they told me, to carry out the testing of the turbine in our factory funds of
the order of a million rubles are needed”. The presiding deputy commissar for heavy
industry M.M. Kaganovich interrupted: “I can provide it”. Kaganovich told another
                                                                                                                               
30 Between 1937 and 1940 average industrial product prices and railway freight
charges rose at rates varying from 6 to 56 per cent (Bergson, 1961, 367–8), and
annual earnings by 30 per cent (ibid., 422).
31 Equipment orders for the army and navy in 1937 were 5.7 billion rubles
(Davies and Harrison, 2000, 82), and 14.5 billion rubles for the army alone in 1940
(Harrison, 1996, 281).
32 RGAE, 8159/1/6, 74 (December 1936).
33 RGAE, 8162/1/300, 65–66, 80–81 (17 November 1940).
34 Ordway and Sharpe (1979), 242, 253. I am not familiar with similar estimates
of the overall development costs of the jet engine in Britain or Germany.
35 Table 3 suggests a total of 87 project years from 1932 to 1944; take 100 in case
of omitted projects. Take the late 1930s as the standard, so each project year cost half
a million rubles, making 50 million rubles as the cumulative total. One prewar ruble
was worth anything from 10 and 35 US wartime cents (Harrison, 1996, 275); again,
take the upper figure, which gives $17.5 millions. Add some more for luck.
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designer to proceed if he could to a flight test: “Whatever it costs I’ll pay”. He
summed up: “I am not so poor, we have money in the sums that are needed, the boss
is not hoarding it, comrade Ordzhonikidze [G.K. Ordzhonikidze, Kaganovich’s
superior] says to take what you need.”36
At first sight, ignoring the cost to society, soft budget constraints might seem like
a good thing because the chances of successful invention would appear to increase
with the number of generously funded projects. However, soft budget constraints
probably also encouraged adverse behavioural responses. Hanson and Pavitt note a
tendency of government–funded R&D to generate “too few technical alternatives”;
this is because, when budget constraints are soft, R&D agents display too little care in
coming to conclusions. They “do not apply the normal, prudent practice of
commercial firms in carefully exploring technical alternatives in order to reduce
technical and commercial alternatives. Instead, they tend to follow a high risk strategy
of premature commitment to the full scale commercial development of a particular
technical configuration, before the reduction of key technical and commercial
uncertainties”.37 In other words, uncertain outcomes are not a good reason to throw
money at a problem.
Moreover, soft budget constraints for existing projects did not mean unlimited
funding for the field as a whole. Rather, funding was limited otherwise, by
administrative denial of funding to new proposals and interventions to terminate
projects in progress. In the interwar years progress in jet propulsion was accompanied
by an institutional cycle. In the first phase new technological possibilities were
defined and exploration began in a dispersed, fragmentary way. Proposals acquired
funding and financial constraints were relatively soft, so projects proliferated.
Resource commitments grew and became dispersed. At a certain point the authorities
lost patience with rising expenses and lack of results. The need was felt to concentrate
resources and focus efforts more narrowly, so the second phase of the cycle took the
form of terminating those projects judged less successful and concentrating funding
on a limited range of priorities in a limited range of organisations. Then the cycle was
repeated because beyond a point concentration resulted in mistakes: scientific
exploration and experimentation were curtailed in some direction or other that would
subsequently prove useful. Therefore, concentration was usually temporary because
challenges to central priorities and organisational monopolies would emerge from
below and the first phase would begin again.
There were two complete cycles in the interwar years. The first cycle began in the
1920s and culminated at the beginning of our period. It was marked by the
establishment of RNII as the centre for jet propulsion R&D; at the same time aircraft
design had been deliberately concentrated in TsAGI (the Central Aero–
Hydrodynamic Institute), and conventional aeroengineering in TsIAM (the Central
Institute for Aviation Engineering). The second cycle is illustrated in figure 5; it
culminated in the purge of RNII and its conversion to NII–3, an establishment
specialised in rocket ammunition. A third cycle began in 1940 but was interrupted by
the war.
3. The Funding Principals
David Holloway has suggested that the diffusion of major innovations through the
Soviet defence sector may be analysed in terms of the balance between supply–side
or “discovery–push” factors and “demand–pull” factors.38 In the case of jet
propulsion projects, which predominated?
                                                
36 RGAE, 8328/1/824, 40, 51, 52ob (22 August 1936).
37 Hanson and Pavitt (1987), 46.
38 Holloway (1982a), 288.
13
I will refer to the actors on the demand side as the funding principals. At times
we may need to distinguish among them between the fundholder and the funding
department. The fundholder was the legal owner of the R&D assets, usually a
production commissariat, but the Red Army also maintained its own R&D
establishments. The funding department paid for R&D services. Centralised orders
were paid out of the USSR state budget. In addition, budgetary institutions such as the
defence commissariat were entitled to enter into decentralised contracts with
industrial institutes and design bureaux for R&D services. Finally, the fundholder
could also commission R&D services on an in–house basis from its own
establishments. For example, we find that the 11 725 thousand rubles of total
expenditure on research planned by NII–3 in 1940 were to be financed partly from the
state budget, partly from decentralised contracts made with outside funding
departments, and partly by the fundholder, the ammunition commissariat, represented
by the chief administration; the breakdown was as follows:39
Source of funding Number of projects Thousand rubles
State budget 18 5 790
Contracts 15 3 440
Chief administration 12 2 495
Both fundholders and funding departments compiled operational plans for
research and experimentation within a framework of strategic directives that were
issued from time to time by high–level government committees: the Council for
Labour and Defence, the executive subcommittee of the Council of People’s
Commissars responsible for defence matters, and the war cabinet. In practice,
regardless of the formal issuing authority, effective decision–making power was
secretly exercised by Stalin personally in consultation with a varying circle of
members of the Politburo or, in wartime, his war cabinet, usually after receiving
representations or representatives of the funding departments and fundholders.40
Among the most important directives affecting R&D for jet propulsion during the
period under review were the following:41
Date Issuing authority Decision
July 1932 KO SNK (defence committee of the
Council of People’s Commissars)
To intensify research on jet propulsion
Sept. 1933 STO (Council of Labour and Defence) To establish RNII
July 1940 KO SNK To proceed with design of Liul’ka
turbojet
Aug. 1941 GKO (State Defence Committee, or
war cabinet)
To proceed with design of
Bolkhovitinov (“BI”) rocket fighter
Nov. 1942 GKO To produce Kostikov (“302”) rocket
fighter
Feb. 1944 GKO To establish NII–1
May 1944 GKO To proceed with design of a number of
rocket and jet aircraft and engines
Within this framework both funding departments and fundholders formulated
operational plans. The most important planning horizon was annual. The Red Army
                                                
39 RGAE, 8162/1/449, 3 (14 January 1941).
40 Khlevniuk et al. (1995); Khlevniuk (1996).
41 Danilov (1981), 71.
14
had an annual plan for the development of military inventions some of which it
funded directly through its own R&D establishments and some of which it contracted
out to other organisations. Industrial ministries, including the branches of the defence
industry, had their own R&D plans, including an annual plan for aeroengine research
and experimentation to be carried out by its own institutes and bureaux, part of which
was made up by contracts accepted from the Red Army.
How did projects win a place in the plan? There was a variety of routes, but their
common feature was that the initiative lay with the designer. This was not a process
whereby all–seeing and all–knowing planners identified needs from above, sought out
designers, and put them together with resources to meet the needs identified. Rather,
proposals came first from below. This was recognised by commissar for the aircraft
industry A.I. Shakhurin when he explained to deputy prime minister N.A.
Voznesenskii in February 1941: “Work on the creation of jet propulsion engines at
home in the USSR […] began on the initiative of a few engineers taking the form of
inventors’ proposals”.42
Successful proposals required investments in lobbying. Such investments could
bring not only success for individual proposals but also long–term privileged
relationships with government officials responsible for funding. This could make it
difficult to establish where the initiative lay and blur the whole distinction between
discovery–push and demand–pull as a result. To win support for their projects and
adoption of their designs, designers had to be “heterogeneous engineers” capable of
reshaping organisational as well as technological constraints.43 To create a demand
for new designs they had to build coalitions with soldiers or industrialists to
overcome interests vested in markets for products that already existed.44 In particular,
they had to overcome the preference of industry for the undisturbed mass production
of weapons in long serial runs, which was often at odds with radical product
innovation and the risks and requirements of continual upheaval in production. 45
For example, the aircraft designer P.O. Sukhoi is said to have won success in
having his designs adopted only after he took on a partner, E.A. Ivanov, who had the
political and bureaucratic skills to push his product through the military and party–
state apparatus.46 This provides an exception to the rule that Soviet producers did not
need to hire marketing agents, only supply facilitators or tolkachi. Other examples are
the alliances formed in Germany by the turbojet pioneer Hans von Ohain with the
aircraft manufacturer Otto Heinkel, and in the Soviet Union by the rocket pioneers
with the military leader M.N. Tukhachevskii. 47
                                                
42 RGAE, 8044/1/460, 59 (5 February, 1941). This was the case not only with jet
propulsion, as the history of the Soviet “uranium project” suggests: even in this most
secret and unified project in the history of the Soviet Union, the first movers were the
atomic physicists (Holloway, 1994, especially chapter 4, 72–95).
43 MacKenzie (1996), 13.
44 Holloway (1982a), 292. On the political “connectedness” of successful postwar
Soviet designers see Almquist (1990). 70–3.
45 Berliner (1976), 534–8; on the defence industry specifically see Albrecht
(1989), 195–7 and 207–8.
46 Ozerov (1973 ), 53.
47 Siddiqi (2000a), 7. According to Peter Kappus of BMW, interviewed in 1974
by Ermenc (1990), 91, the support of Heinkel was critical to Ohain’s success with the
turbojet in Germany and explained why Whittle took twice as long in the UK.
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Tukhachevskii, Red Army chief of armament from 1931 to 1936, was the single
most important patron of jet propulsion in the Soviet Union between the wars.48
Under his aegis at the outset was the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory (GDL),
founded in 1929 by the Red Army’s administration for military inventions for the
development of solid–fuelled rocket ammunition. In Moscow in 1931 a voluntary
society of rocket scientists, the Group for Study of Jet–Propelled Motion (GIRD),
began to promote the cause of space exploration based on liquid–fuelled rocketry.49
The group was led by Korolev and sponsored by the civil defence organisation
Osoaviakhim. In September 1933 Tukhachevskii sponsored a merger of GDL and
GIRD in a new establishment subordinated directly to him, the Jet Propulsion
Research Institute (RNII).50 He hoped perhaps to acquire a monopoly as both
fundholder and funding authority for all forms of jet propulsion development. But to
his frustration, by a decree of the Council for Labour and Defence the new
establishment was almost immediately transferred to the commissariat of heavy
industry under Ordzhonikidze.51 This followed the precedent of existing parallel
arrangements for TsAGI and TsIAM.
Although no longer the fundholder, the Red Army and Tukhachevskii personally
retained close involvement with RNII as the funding department contracting for much
of its R&D output. RNII was an unhappy marriage, and divisions soon emerged
between the weapons specialists of GDL and the space enthusiasts of GIRD. The new
director I.T. Kleimenov, formerly head of GDL, curtailed work on liquid–fuelled
rockets on the grounds of its low expected military utility, sidelining Korolev and the
other GIRDovtsy. The result was a huge row that embroiled RNII and the local party
organisation, and pitched Korolev and Tukhachevskii against Kleimenov and
Ordzhonikidze.52 In 1935 Tukhachevskii exploited these divisions to recruit Korneev,
an engineer dismissed by Kleimenov, and some other former GIRDovtsy to KB–7, a
new design bureau devoted to liquid–fuelled rocketry and established under the Red
Army administration for military inventions.53 Thus he became a fundholder in jet
propulsion development once more, although without a monopoly.
For reasons that are largely unrelated to this topic Tukhachevskii was arrested in
May 1937 and, along with many other officers, subsequently executed as a traitor.54
After this, the cause of aviation jet propulsion lacked a high–level sponsor until
                                                
48 In November 1929 the post of chief of armament of the Red Army was created
to help carry through its equipment modernisation. The first chief of armament was
Army Commander I.P. Uborevich, followed in 1931 by Army Commander, later
Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskii. Among the departments reporting to the chief of
armament was an administration for military inventions. In 1936 the post of chief of
armament was abolished, its place taken by a chief administration for supply of
weapons and equipment, and under the latter a department for inventions (see
Holloway, 1982a, 321). On Tukhachevskii and Red Army rearmament more
generally see Samuelson (1996 and 2000) and Stoecker (1998).
49 GARF, 8418/6/243, 35–37 (14 May 1933).
50 RGVA, 4/14/1171, 33 (23 January 1934); see also Siddiqi (2000a), 4–7.
51 RGVA, 34272/1/146, 134 (31 October 1933).
52 RGVA, 34272/1/177, 5–10 (27 May 1934), 17–19 (29 May 1934), 20–21 (June
1934), 1–2 (26 July 1934), and 33 (13 September 1934). See also Siddiqi (2000a), 7–
9; Siddiqi (2000b).
53 Siddiqi (2000a), 8.
54 Stoecker (1998), 000–000; Samuelson (2000), 186–7.
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Stalin’s deputy and central committee secretary G.M. Malenkov began to take an
interest in 1943. 55
4. The First–Movers
Who held the initiative in the Soviet market for jet propulsion projects? The
stereotype of a command system might lead one to suppose that the initiative lay
above with the funding authority. The existence of connections of patronage and
networking between funding principals and R&D agents makes this a more
complicated issue.
One way of weighing the question up is to ask what was the most important
difficulty for the funding principals: was it to promote, or to limit the number of
projects involving jet propulsion? The clearcut answer to this question is that the
funding principals struggled continually to limit and constrain initiatives and
proposals from below. Rather than the funding principals having to stimulate activity
at lower levels, it was initiatives from below that were critical in stimulating higher–
level interest and finding patrons. These initiatives were diverse and flowed from
many sources, and were much more numerous than initiatives from above. One result
is that R&D projects had a tendency to proliferate that the funding principals found
difficult to control. This is reflected in the character of high–level decisions: reports
and resolutions prescribing the consolidation or cancellation of existing rival projects
greatly outweighed the number of decisions authorising new ones.
In the present section I describe briefly the sources of proposals from lower
levels, which were of three kinds: from established designers, from backyard
inventors, and from foreigners. I note separately the uses that these proposals made of
information from the foreign press and foreign commercial information.
Initiatives of Established Designers
Established designers constantly brought proposals for radical innovations to the
attention of funding principals; it was their job to do so. As an example of the former,
here is deputy commissar M.M. Kaganovich who was responsible for the aircraft
industry in 1936: 56
Three years ago comrade Tsvetkov came to me and proposed making such a turbine, I
went to the boss, the people’s commissar signed a decree to the effect that, in urgent
order, under personal responsibility, [inaudible] to make a turbine […]
Designers worked to secure ministerial approval and the funding that followed. If
refused at one level, they appealed to the next. If necessary they initiated projects
unofficially, without waiting for authorisation, based on the resources of the
organisations within which they worked, then used preliminary results in lobbying to
gain official backing. 57
                                                
55 See for example RGAE, 8044/1/984, 264–275 (22 October 1943) for a report
on the history and perspectives of jet propulsion prepared for Malenkov by aircraft
industry commissar Shakhurin.
56 RGAE, 8328/1/824 (22 August 1936), 35.
57 The principle is illustrated by an anecdote (Perakh, 1998, §9.1): in the 1930s
A.F. Ioffe, director of the Physical–Technical Institute in Leningrad, was approached
by a group of young scientists who wanted to embark on research in atomic physics.
Ioffe recognised the potential of their proposal but was under continuous pressure to
give more resources to applied research. He realised it might be difficult to justify it
to the party authorities, and resolved to go ahead by means of a ruse. He allocated
laboratory space to the atomic physics project unofficially, and posted a sign on the
door: “Stockroom”. As he expected, at the next inspection the party officials walked
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Such behaviour and its consequences are revealed in a statement by NII–3
director A.G. Kostikov to a meeting of his scientific–technical council in May 1942 at
a moment when resources could not have been more under strain:58
As an example of how we are forced to diffuse the attention of our cadres I will take the
first research department. There are 26 [research] topics for 10 engineers. Some of these
topics are incidental to our institute and do not match its profile or specialisation. These
topics arose because there were people to put them forward and instead of passing them
on to those organisations for whom such topics were more appropriate we engaged in
them ourselves. […] It’s characteristic of such topics that working on them involves
unnecessary investigations since [we have] no matching experience. Often what is done is
done many times, and all because we took on what was not our business, because we have
neither experience nor cadres to work on items that do not match the profile of our
institute.
Initiatives of Backyard Inventors
Ordinary citizens with and without technical qualifications also wrote to the Red
Army with ideas and proposals for work on high–speed, high–altitude aviation, a few
of which were taken up.
The files of the Red Army administration for military inventions show, for
example, that in April 1932 and again in March 1936 one E.A. Blau submitted
proposals for different aeroengines based on jet propulsion. These proposals were
reviewed and rejected. In the judgement of one reviewer, “despite the fact that the
author is an engineer [his designs] are distinguished by their naivety and demonstrate
a complete absence of elementary information concerning jet propulsion”.59 Another
file collects 51 proposals for jet, rocket, or turbine engines and airframes that were
submitted in 1937, some professionally executed, some handwritten and childishly
illustrated. Each proposal was either met with formal requests for further information
or else rejected out of hand. One author proposed to lighten his superheavy airframe
by filling the wings with hydrogen, neglecting the fact that a cubic metre of hydrogen
generates only one kilogramme of buoyancy; another proposed a winged or cruise
missile but omitted to allow for a guidance system or automatic stabilisation. 60
A somewhat special case is presented by GIRD, a voluntary society until it was
merged with GDL to form RNII in 1933. The GIRDovtsy were not exactly backyard
inventors but they were not conscripts either. They were civilian enthusiasts who
worked with minimal funding or other official sponsorship, fired by their own
enthusiasm. Their great achievement was the successful launch of the Soviet Union’s
first liquid–fuelled rocket in August 1933. 61
Initiatives by Foreign Designers
In the late 1920s and early 1930s sympathetic foreigners with a technical interest
wrote to the Red Army drawing its attention to the military significance of work on
rocketry going on abroad and offering to promote such work in the Soviet Union. For
example, in 1932 a German specialist in rocketry and communist party member or
sympathiser, Rolf Engel, was referred to Tukhachevskii. According to his biography
he had worked in German astronomy and as a member of the Verein für
Raumschiffart (Association for Space Travel) at its test firing range outside Berlin.
                                                                                                                               
straight past without curiosity. The project was safe until the time was right for Stalin
to recognise the importance of atomic physics.
58 RGAE, 8162/1/574, 101 (7 May 1942).
59 RGVA, 29/56/349 (1932–1936).
60 RGVA, 29/56/354 (1937).
61 GARF, 8418/6/243, 42 (22 August 1933).
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Engel volunteered a report on developments in rocketry in Germany and abroad,
emphasising the breadth and depth of German developments; finally, he proposed to
bring a group to the Soviet Union to collaborate with Soviet rocketeers.62
Designers’ Initiatives Based on the Foreign Press
Established designers were able to monitor the foreign press and work the
information they obtained in order to push experimental aerospace projects up the
agenda and support claims for funding.
The Red Army chief of armament’s files for 1931 testify to the pressure from
below to note progress abroad and emulate it at home. This pressure was given a clear
relevance to funding decisions. For example, in May 1931 GDL director
Petropavloskii reported to the Red Army on work on rocketry abroad, mainly in
Germany and the United States.63 In Germany a number of research groups and firms
(including Junkers and Opel) were described as competing for both patents and
funding under the umbrella of a voluntary society for space travel including armed
forces representatives. The American scene was said to be characterised by a similar
mix of commercial and military motivations. Petropavlovskii noted the applications
of rocketry to aviation as well as artillery, including the possibility of an aircraft with
a primary rocket power plant capable of speeds of 1000 kilometres per hour and
higher. In a similar survey submitted at the same time the GDL rocket engineer
Glushko emphasised both the intensity of activity in the West and the solubility of the
basic issues in building rocket aircraft; he concluded that “in the West both industrial
and particularly military circles are keenly interested in the question of creating
rocket shells and apparatuses”.64
In the mid–1930s the absence of foreign press information was used to promote
claims for funding of foreign commercial expeditions. For example RNII director
Kleimenov used this reasoning on three occasions in 1936 to request permission to
send his engineers abroad generally, then on a tour of Germany, France, Britain, and
America, then to the Paris air show.65
In general the lack of foreign press information was taken to mean that foreign
powers were pressing ahead with developments in secret. At the same time the
limited information that was obtained from foreign publications was analysed
exhaustively and exploited in funding claims. In 1939 an article on developments in
rocketry that had appeared three years earlier in the Italian journal Revista Maritima
was eventually passed through to NII–3 director Slonimer.66 The latter cited the
article as providing evidence of Germany’s intensive development of rocket
munitions, in support of requests to make good the institute’s needs with regard to
finance, material supplies, and engineering workers. He also requested additional
information to be gathered abroad by the “corresponding organisations” and put in for
permission to send a delegation from the institute to New York to an armaments
exhibition.67 The following year he made a similar request to send two specialists to
                                                
62 RGVA, 34272/1/146, 28–39 (no date but 1932).
63 RGVA, 34272/1/105, 91–94ob (20 May 1931).
64 RGVA, 34272/1/105, 118–120 (May 1931).
65 RGAE, 8159/1/149, 220 (26 July 1936), 219 (29 September 1936) and 218 (13
October 1936).
66 The reference was to Revista Maritima, 1936, no. 6, 421–439; see RGAE,
7516/1/324, 12–42, for the translation. The article was mainly devoted to rocket
artillery, but possible applications to aviation were discussed on the final page.
67 RGAE, 7516/1/324, 1–4 (9 April 1939).
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Germany to find out more about work on rocketry there, again citing the Revista
Maritima article in support.68
A survey of the historical applications of rocketry written in the ammunition
commissariat in 1939 noted that, despite the veil of secrecy that had descended over
most military aspects of rocketry abroad, the little that was being published testified
to the urgency of rivalry in rocket technology. The examples the author cited were
from a French work translated into Russian in the defence commissariat.69 A
translation of an American article from 1939 listed the potential uses of rockets as
ranging from field artillery to intercontinental bombardment and space exploration,
and emphasised their ease of construction and use.70
Press information was not cut off with the outbreak of war. Following the April
1941 maiden flight of the Whittle jet–powered Gloster E.28/39, Flight magazine
published a series of articles about jet propulsion in London. These articles were
subsequently collected in a booklet and republished by the magazine editor.71 It
appears to be in this version that they reached the Soviet Union. Their impact was
significant. The booklet circulated among designers; the description of the Italian
Caproni–Campini N.1 of 1940 is reported to have encouraged staff at TsAGI in a
similar design.72 In July 1944 commissar for the aircraft industry Shakhurin copied
many original Flight drawings to illustrate both existing and futuristic jet and turbine
projects in a long briefing report for Malenkov. 73
There is no indication that Soviet aeroengine designers had access to any
information about the progress of jet engines or rocketry in any other country from
unconventional means such as espionage.
Designers’ Initiatives Based on Foreign Commercial Information
Trade links provided information to designers, but its value to those lobbying for
resources for jet propulsion projects was limited by trade restrictions arising from
military secrecy. In 1935 the aircraft designer A.N. Tupolev visited the United States
(this was his second visit, the first have taken place in 1929/30) and toured a number
of aircraft factories. He saw nothing of American progress in military rocketry and his
report was silent on the whole issue of jet propulsion. 74 But even without secrecy
considerations this would be unsurprising because the Americans had invested so
little. Surveys of the German aircraft industry were also carried out in the context of
the August 1939 nonaggression pact and reported to the secretariat of the
commissariat for the aircraft industry in September 1940. It is more significant that
these were innocent of information concerning the immense German investment and
active progress towards new jet and rocket aircraft and artillery. 75
                                                
68 RGAE, 8162/1/305, 30 (16 April 1940).
69 RGAE, 7516/1/324 (no date but 1939), 10.
70 RGAE, 7516/1/323, 1–18 (no date but 1939), translates “What can we expect
of rockets?” by Major James Randolph of the US Army artillery reserve, published in
Army Ordnance, 19(112), Jan.–Feb. 1939, 225 ff.
71 Smith (no date).
72 Gordon and Dexter (1999), 150. The Italian aircraft was based on a principle
similar to that illustrated in figure 4, but it had no airscrew and relied entirely on a jet
for forward motion. Its piston engine drove the compressor, nothing else.
73 RGAE, 8044/1/1182, 123–147 (28 July 1944).
74 RGVA, 29/38/96, 1–479 (10 June 1936).
75 RGAE, 8044/1/359, 1–187 (27 September 1940); 8044/1/358, 1–9 (29
September 1940).
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5. Refinancing
When projects are long term, projects in progress require periodic refinancing.
Alternatively, they must be discontinued. By examining refinancing decisions
affecting projects in progress we can learn more about the incentives facing designers
and funding principals and the calculations they made. There was also a mechanism
for the resolution of disputes over refinancing: designers could and did appeal the
outcomes of adverse decisions to higher authority, ultimately to Stalin.
Decisions to Refinance
Under the system that I have described, projects arose out of initiatives at lower
levels. The role of funding principals and planning decisions was reactive and tended
to validate these initiatives. Consequently the refinancing of projects in progress was
normal and explicit decisions to this effect are not normally observed. An exceptional
insight is provided by a ministerial review of continuing projects in steam turbine
development held in 1936. As table 1 shows, the first projects to build an aviation
steam turbine began in 1933. During the 1930s no less than ten such projects found
funding sponsorship. Six can be associated with named designers: Aksiutin,
Kozhevnikov, Przheslavskii, Sinev, Tsvetkov, and the partnership of Dybskii and
Udod. All had been closed down by the end of 1939.
The attraction of the steam turbine lay in the fact that it was a proven technology
that could be operated with existing materials. Its weakness as a source of aviation
power lay in its low power–to–weight and power–to–volume ratios, in particular the
requirement for large boilers and condensers which could not be accommodated
within an airframe light enough to be driven by the turbine.76 In August 1936 M.M.
Kaganovich chaired a meeting of his technical council in the chief administration for
the aircraft industry on the development of a number of steam turbine projects.
Kaganovich’s mood was one of intense frustration, and he repeatedly interrupted the
designers with heavy sarcasm:77
With existing dimensions is it sensible or feasible to place such a plant in an aircraft? One
turbine engineer suggested placing 5 turbines in an aircraft, but for this the aircraft must
weigh 125 tons without additional payload. You could put a F[eliks] D[zerzhinskii]
locomotive in an aircraft, but then the aircraft would weigh 2000 tons. This is comrade
B[inaudible]’s fantasy, he’s got 245–metre wings and a 45–metre fuselage.
[…] We’re not talking about a boiler on a Tsvetkov locomotive. Whoever’s first to give
us a turbine, we’ll take it and work with it and the result will be that the airscrew will turn
on the ground, if we put an airscrew on a locomotive it’ll also turn, but we need to put it
in an aircraft at altitude [emphasis added].
[…] Three years ago comrade Tsvetkov came to me and proposed making such a turbine,
I went to the boss, the people’s commissar signed a decree to the effect that, in urgent
order, under personal responsibility, [inaudible] to make a turbine, [they] began to make
it, and now he comes and says: “There’s a turbine but no boiler”. That’s how they move
technology forward. It’s as if we got pig–iron but no metal.
[…] I said to comrade Aksiutin […] I’ll give you a TB–7 airplane, smash it to pieces if
you want, but taxi it along, lift it up to 100 metres, and then it will be a deed of proof that
a turbine lifts up. Whatever it costs I’ll pay. But […]
[…] I can’t sit for three years and see no results.
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The designers’ response was to plead for time to allow the technology to evolve.
They promised to build smaller, more efficient boilers and condensers. The aircraft
designers Petliakov and Lavochkin were present. It was obvious that the engines
being designed would not fit an existing airframe, so Petliakov asked that there
should be more consideration of aircraft design and Kaganovich promptly put him in
charge of liaison. Money and time had been spent, and while there was the smallest
possibility of a positive outcome he was not going to give up. The outcome was that
the steam turbine projects drifted on for three more years before the last was closed
down. Regrettably, the decisions to close them down have not been found. The
projects simply vanished one by one from plans and reports.
Decisions Not To Refinance
A straightforward decision not to refinance a project in progress is illustrated from a
file of the Red Army department of inventions.78 In October 1937 engineer R.G.
Sergeev of the design department of aircraft factory no. 22 at Fili submitted a
proposal to design a 500– to 1000–kilogramme thrust rocket motor for an auxiliary
flight booster, aircraft launcher, or rocket fighter. He based his proposal on a
suggestion by the German specialist Eugen Sänger that had been published in an
unnamed Swiss journal in 1936. He signed an agreement with the department of
inventions on 15 August 1938 for the sum of 5000 rubles. He failed to complete the
work promised, so his expenses were paid off in the sum of 1000 rubles only on 26
September 1940. From this we learn that small sums were easily written off. Bigger
decisions were usually more complicated.
We know more about decisions not to refinance projects from the turbulent
history of RNII. Frustration with the results of military R&D boiled over in the
purges of 1937–8.79 In May 1937 Tukhachevskii was arrested. The purge of RNII
began in October with the arrest of director Kleimenov, Glushko, and others
including the rocket mortar designer G.E. Langemak. In June 1938 work on the
Korolev–Glushko rocket glider was suspended, the reasons given being the need to
concentrate resources for rearmament on projects of more immediate military utility.
A few days later Korelev was arrested, accused of being a Trotskyist saboteur, and
sentenced to ten years’ forced labour. Impatience with the lack of results of Korolev’s
work on rocket aviation was clearly a factor. The testing of liquid–fuelled rocket
aircraft was suspended while the rocket artillery programme was stepped up.
The end of KB–7 was decided by a combination of factors. An immediate threat
was the context created by the fate of its sponsor Tukhachevskii. In 1937 KB–7
director Korneev staved off immediate repression by joining in the destruction of the
leading figures of RNII; he sent slanderous allegations to Stalin about Kleimenov. 80
In January 1938, with Tukhachevskii gone, KB–7 was taken away from the Red
Army and handed over to the commissariat of the defence industry where, like RNII
(now NII–3), it was attached to the thirteenth chief administration for ammunition.
But Tukhachevskii had devised KB–7 for the far–off development of liquid–fuelled
rocketry, not the quick results now sought for immediate armament. Over three years
KB–7 produced nothing to show for its outlays. Take for example the report of work
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of the thirteenth chief administration for 1938, which lists the projects completed
under each institute or bureau and the weapons officially adopted by the Red Army
for armament as a result. Under KB–7 the report says only: “for armament in 1938
nothing supplied, in view of the long–term [perspektivnyi] character of work”.81
In the atmosphere of the time KB–7 became an easy target. In early 1939 the Red
Army evidently made a decision to close down a wide range of projects in
ammunition R&D, not just those concerned with aviation jet propulsion, but
including the work it was funding in KB–7. According to reports made to ammunition
commissar I.P. Sergeev, and forwarded by him to deputy defence commissar G.I.
Kulik, navy commissar M.P. Frinovskii, and prime minister V.M. Molotov, the
aggregate plan for ammunition research and experimentation for 1939 had been
agreed among these commissariats and with the General Staff the previous year. 82
However, in the course of disaggregating the plan and agreeing individual contracts
with R&D establishments, the Red Army had unilaterally reneged on commitments
worth 40 million rubles (out of 52.5 millions) and the Navy on 7.5 millions (out of 25
millions). Even after immediate cutbacks, 25 million rubles worth of research and
experimentation remained without a sponsor, including two institutes that were
entirely without funding, one of which was KB–7; among those projects without
funding at NII–3 were the Korolev–Glushko rocket glider and a ramjet project.
The effect of these decisions to withhold refinancing was not straightforward. It is
not known whether Sergeev’s protests received a hearing either in the defence
commissariat or in Molotov’s Council of People’s Commissars. By the end of the
year KB–7 had been closed down; according to Asif Siddiqi the staff, starved of
funding, turned on each other and eventually on Korneev too who was arrested and
imprisoned. 83 On the other hand the rocket glider and ramjet projects at NII–3 were
evidently reinstated, and the Korolev–Glusko RP–318 made its maiden test flight in
its inventors’ absence in 1940. To judge from the annual employment return shown in
table 4, NII–3 continued to expand during 1939 at a high rate, possibly by absorbing
the staff of KB–7. But, as already noted, the funding of NII–3 was squeezed again in
1940 and its expansion was brought to a sudden halt.
In short, in 1939 the funding principal lost patience with its R&D investments
and tried suddenly to impose a harsh constraint on the budget for research and
experimentation. In the short term the attempt was only partly successful because the
constraint was relaxed again to some extent, either as a result of the fundholder’s
lobbying to reverse the curtailment of funding, or by drawing on the fundholder’s
budget, or by some combination of the two. It is possible that the efforts to curtail
R&D funding continued in 1940.
The aircraft industry yields a variety of examples of projects being closed in
response to a lack of results. Ulrich Albrecht lists the Kalinin, Shcherbakov,
Berezniak–Bolkhovitinov, and Gudkov OKBs (experimental design bureaux) as cases
where the entire establishment was closed as a result of failure to create successful
designs.84 In some cases the chief designer was imprisoned (Gudkov) or executed
(Kalinin). These and similar episodes including the purge of RNII made subsequent
threats of extreme penalties for R&D failures highly credible. For example, the key
staff responsible for designing the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb all expected to
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be arrested if it failed to detonate.85 The need for credible penalisation of individuals
for R&D failures could be seen as a consequence of the difficulty of making credible
commitments to financial penalties for project failure.
Appeals Against Adverse Decisions
Some designers were quick to appeal against decisions to discontinue project
financing to higher authority. Disputes within RNII were a plentiful source of
petitions. For example, in May 1934 both Korneev and Korolev complained to higher
party and military authorities over the suppression of liquid–fuelled rocketry projects
by RNII director Kleimenov.86 After the RNII purge, like many loyal victims of
repression Korolev wrote to both Beriia and Stalin personally from prison to protest
his innocence and plead for his return to work, as well as appealing directly to the
prosecutor.87
Those who appealed to higher authority against adverse decisions were taking a
decision to place greater trust in vertical relationships than in horizontal ones. For
some this was a risky strategy. For an appeal to succeed, it was necessary for the
appellant to have a previously accumulated reputation with higher authority. This was
usually either a reputation for achievement, won by making an outstanding
contribution to society, or a reputation for loyalty gained by betraying real or alleged
wrong doing by potential rivals in the horizontal network. Reputation for loyalty was
intrinsically fragile; it could be easily discredited by others choosing the same
strategy. For less talented agents, therefore, winning a reputation for loyalty to
superiors was a good way of making enemies, and to risk one’s credit at higher levels
without substantial achievement to back it up simply ensured self–destruction as the
fate of Korneev in 1939 suggests.
Liul’ka too is said to have had the reputation of a “complainer” (zhalobshchik ).88
His petition to Stalin of May 1942 to allow him to resume work on the turbojet is a
rare case in that it led to the result that the petitioner envisaged.89 But Liul’ka’s
petition was based on a degree of achievement, at least, rather than on the revelation
of his rivals’ wrong doing; it may have suited his rivals to go along with his petition
in order to raise the profile of the issue in their own interest.90
Like most such petitions, Korolev’s own appeals from prison were probably
ignored; his subsequent transfer from the Kolyma to the NKVD sharaga at factory
no. 16 in Kazan’ was entirely the result of Tupolev’s intervention on his behalf.91
6. The secondary market
When projects are long term their need for refinancing has the necessary effect of
creating a secondary asset market. Of course in principle this was a centralised system
in which each project was owned by a ministerial fundholder and ownership was not
freely transferable. In reality there were substantial incentives for officials to mount
takeover or merger bids for projects of other fundholding authorities. The attraction
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of a project in progress lay in the sunk costs that had already been incurred at the
expense of others to whom the new fundholder did not have to pay compensation.
Even if the transfer was of people rather than physical assets, the project personnel
brought with them a significant intangible capital: accumulated tacit knowledge. The
cost of takeover was not financial but political. First, a bid required the payment of
direct lobbying costs. Second, it required the expenditure of reputation; a successful
bidder made promises for which he might later be held to account. Third, it
contributed indirectly to weakening the ownership rights over economic assets on
which all fundholders ultimately relied. However, circumstances could easily arise in
which it was more dangerous to abstain from the secondary market than to enter it.
These can easily be translated into the costs and benefits of roving banditry, to
use Mancur Olson’s felicitous metaphor.92 Stalin’s regime was one of a stationary
bandit intent on maximising the long–term rents accruing to a dictator. But in the
secondary market beneath his purview, lesser bandits roved. To a certain point this
was beneficial to the regime; it reallocated resources to those who would put them to
the best use. But the standard of valuation of “best use” was private not social.
Moreover, it tended to dissipate the rents accruing to the dictator, and weakened the
dictator’s drive to maximise his long–run revenues.
In the secondary market for R&D assets the transactions that we can observe
were of three kinds. First, projects were sometimes the object of takeover bids and
bidding wars. Second, theft of intellectual property in particular projects might have
been an issue; there is no evidence of such theft, but there is evidence that measures
were taken to prevent it. Third, some projects were taken over by the NKVD on the
basis of its powers of arrest and confinement.
Takeovers and Mergers
Which was better: to be large or small? In the command system to be small was only
advantageous if it meant being overlooked. For example, to work in KB–7 in 1937
meant an additional life expectancy of two years compared with work in RNII.
However, under more normal circumstances the command system favoured large
projects because of their economies of scope: larger units required fewer lines of
outside communication and were less reliant on outsiders for essential goods and
services. The preference for scale was reflected in the frequent calls to eliminate
duplication of effort and “parallelism”. Calls for rationalisation and centralisation
were rarely if ever questioned; they were regarded as progressive almost beyond
debate, especially when comparisons were made with the scale of R&D
establishments in aeroengineering abroad.93 As a result, smaller units were always in
danger of being swept up by rivals, while larger units were continually on the lookout
for opportunities for rationalisations favourable to themselves.
The logic of the takeover bid could be seen as a call to restructure liabilities.
Consider a failing project, i.e. one that had incurred significant sunk costs without
giving results on schedule. Was the project intrinsically bad, or just badly funded or
led? If the lack of results compared with the sunk costs could be ascribed to poor
resources or organisation, then it was efficient to write off the sunk costs and
refinance the project under new management. Such a logic was strengthened when
the scope of activity and the number of projects was on the increase because this also
brought a rising number of potentially weak projects. Thus proposals for takeovers
and mergers were particular evident in the years 1937 and 1938, during and after the
RNII purge.
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For example in December 1937 acting director Sinev of SKB (the special–
purpose design bureau) of the commissariat of the defence industry submitted a
memorandum listing six steam turbine projects in progress in four different institutes
and three different cities. Welcoming the piecemeal advances already made, he
criticised their “cottage–industry” scope (kustarshchina). Claiming the support of his
own team and the Khar’kov project leaders, he called for all the groups to be brought
together in a single “unified production–experimentation base” in Moscow, with
close links to the aircraft industry.94
Another channel for proposals for concentration at this time was the system of
peer review. Thus late in 1937 Uvarov from VTI (the All–Union Thermal–Technical
Institute) was commissioned to report to the commissariat of the defence industry on
the progress of a rival “gas–steam turbine” being developed at factory no. 18 by
designers Dybskii and Udod. After commenting on the weaknesses that he had
observed, Uvarov commented: “the continuation of work on the lines under
investigation should be curtailed, the more so since work on steam and gas
turbocompressors is already going on [elsewhere]. These two lines [of work]
completely cover the authors’ design, and for this reason duplication will yield
nothing new”.95
A bid to restructure research on jet aeroengines was directly sparked by the purge
of RNII. Staff of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Theoretical Geophysics wrote
to prime minister Molotov at the end of December 1937; Molotov’s secretary
forwarded it to both defence commissar K.E. Voroshilov and deputy commissar for
defence industry M.M. Kaganovich for comment.96 The writers pointed to the unmet
needs of Soviet aviation in contrast to the resources being devoted to jet aeroengine
development by the “capitalist countries”, the designs being pursued by the Breguet
and Junkers companies in France and Germany, and the veil of military secrecy
which concealed real progress abroad. They ascribed resistance to jet designs in the
Soviet Union to “presently exposed enemies of the people”, an alliance of soldiers
and designers including Langemak of RNII and Efimov, chief of the Red Army
artillery administration, both recently executed. As for the engineers working in the
field such as I.A. Merkulov, they charged them with “creating ‘conditions’ of work
bordering on mockery” (the phrase “bordering on” was probably significant: not
actually  mockery, just bordering on it). They called for a policy of concentration of
personnel and projects in one or more enlarged collectives based on KB–7. The
writers concluded with a proposal for pure and applied research encompassing
ramjets, pulse–jets, and hybrid engines.
This was therefore an example either of an altruistic takeover bid or a takeover
bid by proxy, since the Institute of Theoretical Geophysics had no clear interest in the
fortunes of KB–7. The bid was unsuccessful. Kaganovich called on the new NII–3
director Kostikov for comment. The latter presented a strongly argued case for his
own institute to be the new centre for jet engine R&D, based on a short scientific
review of jet concepts and experimental results. He concluded that it was essential to
draw into this line of work people “closely involved with aviation technology” as
opposed to those “incidentally showing an interest” (this was a slighting reference to
KB–7); Kaganovich in turn supported the NII–3 position.97 So did the Army: the new
air force chief Loktionov wrote to Voroshilov supporting the writers of the Institute
of Theoretical Geophysics in principle but rejecting the case for KB–7 on grounds
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that the latter lacked the necessary research and production equipment. He
recommended NII–3 as the new centre for jet engine development, and deputy
defence commissar Fed’ko repeated these arguments to Molotov adding a proposal
that NII–3 absorb relevant personnel of KB–7.98 This was the eventual outcome,
although KB–7 survived until the end of 1939.
Shortly afterwards a new struggle arose for control over the development of
aviation steam turbines: yes, this was still “work in progress”, and the lack of results
was being attributed not to intrinsic badness of the project but to dispersion of
resources and duplication of effort. In mid–1938 the commissariat of the defence
industry submitted to Molotov its long–delayed draft plan for aeroengine
experimentation for that year. It proposed that all work on aviation steam turbines
should be centralised in TsKTI (the Central Boiler and Turbine Institute) in Leningrad
and that a grant of 2.5 million rubles should be made to TsKTI to expand its plant and
equipment for this purpose.99 On the defensive this time, SKB director Sinev wrote to
Molotov, the Kaganovich brothers (one commissar for the defence industry, the other
the responsible central committee secretary), and defence commissar Voroshilov to
protest this recommendation. 100 Sinev made three charges against TsKTI: it lacked an
“aviation culture”; it was ineffective even at its primary task, the design of steam
turbines for power stations; and it was already “overlarge” (gromozdkaia ). Again he
proposed the formation of a new bureau in Moscow based on one of a range of
existing aviation establishments.
This was therefore a defensive move against a hostile takeover. But the defence
failed; it was referred to air force chief Loktionov, who rejected it and upheld the
recommendation in favour of TsKTI.101 And as table 1 shows 1938 saw the end of
aviation steam turbines at SKB. On the other hand the victory of TsKTI was hollow,
because steam aviation was going nowhere and all such projects had been closed
down by the end of 1939. In the end, after spending tens of millions of rubles,
everyone had to recognise that these were just bad projects.102
As has been seen, the years 1938 and 1939 brought a dramatic curtailment in the
number of projects in aviation rocket and jet R&D. In 1940 a new expansion phase
began. Therefore it is no surprise to find that, in his memorandum of February 1941
to deputy prime minister Voznesenskii, commissar of the aircraft industry Shakhurin
listed the various ongoing projects and proposed “to concentrate all the work in
progress in [NII–3] of NKBP [the ammunition commissiat] … and transfer the
institute to NKAP [the commissariat of the aircraft industry]”, enclosing a draft
decree to that effect.103 This particular bid failed for the moment, or was overtaken by
events; after the outbreak of war NII–3 was first subordinated directly to the Council
of People’s Commissars, and handed over to NKAP only in 1944.
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Raids on Intellectual Property
One way in which R&D agents might have captured projects already in progress was
by taking over their new explicit knowledge. The explicit knowledge could then have
been used to underpin new proposals for development funding. The new proposals
would have looked “good” because they would have been in a position to expropriate
rents that should have accrued to the originators of the explicit knowledge without
having to account for the sunk costs of experimentation already incurred by them.
There is no direct evidence of such activity. However, there is evidence that both
designers and ministries regarded plagiarism as a threat to their future rents. For
example, at the August 1936 review of steam turbine projects in the commissariat of
heavy industry it became apparent to Kaganovich that many of the barriers against the
collaboration among designers that he desired were created by the designers
themselves, each intent on protecting his own intellectual monopoly, and by their
departmental superiors. Development work for the Aksiutin turbine was proceeding at
LKZ (the Leningrad Kirov factory), but without results. Why had engineer Vinblad
failed to make himself useful to Aksiutin on the LKZ site? Because no one would
issue him with a pass. Why not? A participating engineer commented: “[..] because
there was rivalry, the special proprietary interest [opeka] of each in this business.
Each was trying to turn this business into a business [associated with] his own
name”.104 In response, Kaganovich was simultaneously reassuring and threatening:105
I will take all measures to protect the authorship of one or another comrade at work. If it’s
Aksiutin’s turbine so let it be, but if he’s up to some fabrication, and not up to realising a
technical solution to the problem, and for this reason has kept Vinblad away from the
installation for a full year, then that is an obvious criminal act and an obvious detriment to
the value of the turbine for our work.
In our country there are no secrets and the designer who holds on to big secrets and does
not carry them out into life –– in the capitalist world he would simply perish and in the
socialist [world] he is simply good for nothing. That’s why we will set in train all
measures and powers to help you realise the ideas and creativity that you have performed,
while you are guaranteed full protection of authorship.
But secrets remained, and the readiness to defend them continued to reflect
departmental interest. Eighteen months later an official of the Leningrad research
institute for naval shipbuilding wrote to the head of the eighteenth chief
administration of the commissariat of the defence industry asking for assistance in
gaining access to the work of Uvarov on gas turbines at VTI in Moscow:106
Our attempts to gain access to the work of Prof. Uvarov have not succeeded. From
personal conversations of our colleague military engineer (first grade) Zotikov with Prof.
Uvarov it became apparent that serving as motives for refusal were hostility to LMZ im.
Stalina [the Leningrad Metallurgical Factory] (more precisely, of chief of the steam
turbine bureau Prof. Grinberg) and in addition ostensibly special instructions about the
secrecy of the work.
The reply of the eighteenth chief administration was a curt refusal to intervene.107
Hostile Takeovers Using Powers of Arrest and Confinement
As is well known the NKVD arrested a number of aircraft and aeroengine designers
in the purges of 1936–8 and used them to formulate proposals for implementing new
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designs. 108 Most were from TsAGI, TsIAM, and the Tupolev design bureau
(including Tupolev himself) at factory no. 156. Tupolev’s sharaga was subsequently
organised as TsKB–29. Of the RNII personnel arrested in 1937, some were shot and
the rest sent to labour camps. Some survivors were subsequently recalled from the
Kolyma and put to work in the NKVD aeroengine sharaga in Kazan'.
7. Good and Bad Projects
There were good reasons for governments to ration the funding of military aviation
R&D. Most important was the fact that the availability of funding attracted both bad
and good projects which those allocating research funding could not tell apart
beforehand. This created strong incentives to ration available funding across projects
and through time. Through time alternative projects could be compared in the hope of
identifying the bad projects that should not be refinanced. Effectively, they were used
to provide information about each other. For example, competitive rivalry eventually
became commonplace in Soviet aviation R&D: rival design bureaux were assigned
specifications by the government, and competed for their designs to be adopted by the
consumer, the defence ministry. 109
This mechanism could not be used in the case of unique projects such as the
building of the first Soviet atomic bomb. In that case, the difficulty was mitigated by
using the results of the Manhattan project, gained through espionage, both to guide
and to monitor Soviet progress.110
A deeper problem persisted even when projects were not unique, if they were
long term; this meant that projects could attract refinancing even when they were
known to be bad. Rationing funding through time enabled the monitoring of progress
so that refinancing decisions could be taken in the light of more information than was
available originally. However, suppose a project was taking longer to complete than
had been promised at the outset. Because some costs were already sunk, it could still
be efficient for both the funding principal and the R&D agent to continue a project
that the principal would have preferred not to finance in the first place.111 The result
was an element of adverse selection: it gave R&D agents an incentive to understate
needs and overstate expected returns so as to obtain the first instalment of funding.
Once the first instalment was paid and had become a sunk cost, the payment of the
next instalment became more likely. Moreover, if results fell short at the stage where
refinancing was necessary, the designer could always shift blame to the funder since
the first instalment of funding was always less than the full sum originally proposed.
What factors determined whether a project was “good” or “bad” from the point of
view of the national mission? This depended on four factors: the unknown state of
nature, the level of funding, the organisation of resources and teamwork, and the
motivation of the design team. First, the state of nature determined whether or not the
project was intrinsically bad. Second, even for an intrinsically good project the level
of funding needed to be appropriate to the task. Third, the physical and human
resources employed on the project required effective organisation, including
teamwork and leadership; a design team that lacked the right equipment or was
poorly led would give poor results. Finally, success depended on motivation: what
was good or bad depended on whether the state saw it the same way as the designer.
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Thus some inventors involved in jet propulsion R&D may have been motivated
otherwise: to realise a dream, to build an empire, to live in style, or to live in peace. In
1937–8, official suspicions of “other” motivation were hardened into the designation
“enemy of the people”. It is not necessary to go to this extreme to accept that R&D
agents’ motivations were not necessarily aligned at all times with the preferences of
the state.
When a project failed, did it matter whether it was intrinsically bad, or potentially
good but poorly funded or organised? Under well–functioning market arrangements
with unconstrained credit, free entry, and competition among many projects, it should
not have mattered: good projects would have driven out bad ones and efficient leaders
would have driven out the rest, and the reasons why some projects failed would have
been of interest only to economic historians. But under Soviet arrangements it was of
great practical significance to the funding principals. This is because, with funding
rationed and entry controlled, there was a danger that bad projects might drive out
good ones. Therefore it was necessary for the funding authorities to diagnose the
causes of project failure to see if they could be rectified. However, it was also
extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible, to do so without hindsight. Even with
hindsight it is still very difficult, and for this reason I avoid comment on the intrinsic
goodness or causes of failure of individual projects. Only classes of project can be
evaluated in this way; for example, all the aviation steam turbine projects were
intrinsically bad, but I do not know which ones were also poorly funded or poorly led.
The various research establishments reported regularly to higher authority on
each project in progress.112 From time to time the same authorities launched special
reviews which ranged from round–table exchanges of specialist opinion concerning
common difficulties shared by several projects, and specific investigations of specific
projects thought to be at risk of failing. But the difficulty of establishing the causes of
project failure made it easy for designers to place the blame for their own lack of
success elsewhere. They tended to blame either the scepticism of the funder or the
incompetence of the producer.113 In the last years before the war they sometimes also
blamed the bad faith of “enemies of the people”.
As has already been shown, designers sometimes implicitly faulted the funder for
providing resources on too small a scale and also for dispersing them too widely, that
is, sharing them with rival projects: they argued that more time and more focused
funding would turn things round. Designers also blamed producers for failure to share
the motivation of the design, leading to incompetent or neglectful preparation of
components and assemblies. For example, the steam turbine designer Aksiutin
complained to Tukhachevskii in 1935 that LKZ was incapable of playing a
constructive role because it was gripped by “a certain conservatism utterly alien to the
aviation culture” and commented that LKZ had declined a contract to build an
Uvarov turbine for VTI giving as its official reason that the turbine required “too
many parts to be completed to ‘aviation standards’ that would be an embarrassment
                                                
112 For example see RGAE, 8159/1/137, 2–28 (no date but 1937), 8162/1/240, 9–
63 (9 January 1940), and 8162/1/449, 2–61 (14 January 1941) for the annual reports
of RNII–NII–3 in 1936, 1939, and 1940 respectively. In 1967 the annual reports for
1937 and 1938 were transferred from RGAE to the archive of the USSR Academy of
Sciences where they can no longer be traced.
113 Whittle (1953), 206–7, ascribes some of the resistance he encountered to an
alliance between the Rover Company and British “officials, who had spent the greater
part of their lives in the familiar field of piston engines, [who] subconsciously
resented the advent of a type of engine which rendered useless much of their
specialised knowledge slowly acquired over many years”.
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for the factory [chto dlia zavoda zatrudnitel’no]”. 114 Again, when Kozhevnikov
investigated the failure to complete construction of the Uvarov gas turbine at the
Kolomna engineering factory during 1938 in a case already cited above, he laid blame
entirely on the incompetent work of the factory, making this a case of a good project
that was badly supported. 115
According to the recollection of the aircraft designer A.S. Iakovlev, Stalin
himself reflected on this problem:
A designer is a creative worker. Like the painter of a picture or the writer of a literary
work, the product of a designer’s or scholar’s creativity can be successful or unsuccessful.
The only difference is that from a picture or verse you can tell the author’s talent right
away. […] With a designer it’s more complicated: his design can look very attractive on
paper, but final success or failure is determined much later as a result of the work of a
numerous collective and after the expenditure of substantial material means … Most
designers get carried away with themselves and are convinced of their own and no one
else’s righteousness; on the basis of an overdeveloped self–regard and the mistrust that is
characteristic of every author they tend to attribute their own failures to prejudice against
themselves and their creations.116
Were the different intrinsic motivations of R&D agents a factor in project success
and failure? Again, these need not have mattered under well–functioning market
arrangements because those projects hijacked to serve someone’s hidden agenda
would have been driven from the market. But Soviet funding institutions offered a
degree of protection for self–serving interests; this made it necessary for the state
mount periodic inquisitions into the motivation of its agents, through which Stalin
and his security chiefs N.I. Ezhov, then L.P. Beriia, sought to peer into the souls of
their scientists and engineers.
A particularly complicated situation arose if the state’s preferences only became
well defined in the course of exploring the technological frontier, and then some of
the R&D agents who had thought themselves to be working to the state’s agenda
found the state to be the party that was unexpectedly otherwise motivated. For
example Korolev became a traitor in 1937 because the state’s agenda had changed,
and he became a hero again in 1957 for the same reason. Finally, this could give rise
to a situation in which R&D agents fought each other for a say in determining
government priorities, and some prevailed at others’ expense. This is roughly what
happened at RNII in the years between its establishment and the purge of 1937–8.
Asif Siddiqi has proposed a framework for understanding motivational conflicts
among the rocket specialists at RNII.117 They clashed over solid versus liquid
propellants, nitric acid versus liquid oxygen, and winged versus ballistic missiles.
Siddiqi suggests that each dispute was organised around differences in agents’
orientation towards long–term goals. Some were more responsive to military
imperatives and saw rocketry primarily as a means of artillery bombardment. A
military orientation led them to favour more stable and storable solid fuels despite
their lower energy content and lower potential for control in flight. They favoured
nitric acid over liquid oxygen because the former was more available and more
storable. Finally they favoured winged over ballistic missiles because winged missiles
could cover longer ranges given weaker engines. Others were ultimately more
interested in the perspectives for exploring the cosmos for which powerful engines
using fuels of exceptionally high energy content were the first essential. The dividing
                                                
114 RGVA, 33989/2/235, 192 (15 December 1935).
115 RGAE, 8328/1/995, 106–16 (9 December 1938).
116 Iakovlev (2000), 501.
117 Siddiqi (2000b).
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line between these two groups was also to a large extent former Red Army GDL
versus formerly civilian GIRD, and ex–Leningrad versus Moscow.
Within RNII the former GIRDovtsy were clearly closer to an aviation problematic
than the artillerymen of former GDL. But in the wider world of Soviet aviation the
men of GIRD were completely atypical. They saw an aircraft as no more than a
convenient temporary platform for a rocket technology ultimately destined for space.
Korolev, for example, promoted the development of the Soviet Union’s first winged
rocket aircraft only as a pragmatic response to the fact that he did not yet have a
rocket motor powerful enough to travel far without wings. In principle he was
completely committed to the development of ballistic rocketry.
The clash between artillerymen and space enthusiasts at RNII simmered through
the mid–1930s before boiling over in the purge of 1937–8 in which the GIRDovtsy
were swept away, taking several of their opponents with them. Why did these
conflicts flare with such intensity? Siddiqi suggests that the technological
uncertainties were simply too large to be settled scientifically on the basis of the
limited funding provided by principals. This heightened the risks of R&D activity,
and high stakes plus limited resources fed back into bitter infighting. 118 But secondary
markets in R&D assets became more active at the same time, which suggests that
agents pursued market–type strategies to insure themselves as well as political
strategies.
Were bad projects deliberately tolerated or fostered at any level in order to
distribute rents and promote vertical relationships of trust and loyalty? Some
allegations concern the rocket designer Kostikov. The background is important, for
Kostikov remains a controversial figure to this day. His critics resent the fact that he
took the public credit for developing the highly successful Katiusha rocket mortar
from its true originator Langemak who was executed.119 They argue that he was not
an accidental beneficiary of the purge at RNII but a willing tool of Ezhov and Stalin,
a renegade GIRDovets who turned against his former comrades. They hold him at
least partly responsible for the repression of Korolev and others.120 Korolev is said to
have carried a lifelong grudge against him for this reason.121
Gennadii Serov has suggested that Kostikov was unduly favoured by Stalin in the
wartime allocation of project funding. In November 1942 Stalin authorised the
development of Kostikov’s unproven design for the 302 rocket fighter, at a time when
the development of new weapons in other fields was being ruthlessly suppressed in
favour of mass production of existing ones. Serov notes the “practically unlimited
financial possibilities” at Kostikov’s disposal: 25 million rubles for NII–3–GIRT in
1943, compared with a similar sum for the Iakovlev and Mikoian aircraft OKBs put
together.122 It is true that subsequently Kostikov was punished for the 302’s failure: in
the spring of 1944 he was sacked, then arrested. On the other hand his punishment
was mild: he was released after a year in prison, and retained his military rank and
decorations. In Iaroslav Golovanov’s words, “Stalin had need of Kostikov, since [the
latter] was one of the bearers of the Stalinist world order”.123
There is more evidence of the dissipation of rents at lower levels. For example,
the collegium of the ammunition commissariat investigated the work of NII–3
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towards the end of 1940. The session was chaired by the minister, commissar
Sergeev. The investigation found that NII–3 director Slonimer had pursued
“deception, sleight of hand, and false representation of the work of the institute” in
relation to rocket armament towards various levels of higher authority up to and
including Malenkov and Voroshilov. 124 He had done so in order to request bonuses
and medals for himself and others, and he had also used these to buy the collusion of
his immediate superior.125
Slonimer had committed other crimes as well. He had ignored orders “to cleanse
the apparatus of NII–3 of politically ill–intentioned elements […] the contamination
of NII–3 by such persons persists to the present day”. He had reported plan fulfilment
in terms of ruble outlays, not in terms of real project completion. He had engaged in
opportunistic plan corrections to make the plan easier to fulfil. He had overbid for
scarce aviation fuel and had diverted it to unauthorised uses for personal transport;
detailed figures were provided. Interestingly Kostikov was also reprimanded for lack
of progress in his work and because, having complained to higher authority about
restrictions imposed on his work by Slonimer, he had failed to alert the authorities to
the (alleged) true state of affairs in the institute. Slonimer was subsequently dismissed
and arrested.
Within a few months it was Sergeev’s turn on the rack. A commission comprising
Marshals Kulik, Novikov, and Kuznetsov reported to Stalin and Molotov that in the
ammunition commissariat under Sergeev bureaucracy, favouritism, and nepotism
were flourishing.126 Subsequently, Sergeev was dismissed.
 But what these episodes show is that, when rent–seeking was identified, it was
punished. If there was safety, it lay in underfunding. Thus, in 1950 Stalin suddenly
accused his favourite aircraft designer Iakovlev of diverting state funds into excessive
salary and bonus payments (“Do you know what they say about you behind your
back? They tell me you are a looter [rvach])”. What saved him was the solidarity of
his immediate superior, minister of the aircraft industry M.V. Khrunichev, who could
assure Stalin that Iakovlev’s design team and production workers were fewer in
number, lower paid, and less well equipped than those of the other designers.127
8. Conclusions
This investigation, while limited to a study of research and experimentation in the
field of aviation jet propulsion, suggests a number of findings of more general
significance.
1. Jet propulsion R&D was carried out in the context of a vertically organised
command system. Within this context there was a great deal of market–like
activity on the supply side including horizontal rivalry, competitive rent–seeking,
and attempts to bar entry and create monopolies. There was also a secondary
market in R&D projects involving takeover and merger activity.
2. The first–mover’s advantage was held by the designer. The evidence is that there
were more initiatives for radical innovation proposals than the authorities were
willing to fund. There was no shortage of inventiveness. The main problem for
the authorities was to control, not to promote inventive activity.
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3. In the Soviet Union jet propulsion R&D was an artisan industry. The resources
made available for new research in jet propulsion were extremely limited and
funding was rationed. However, budget constraints on individual projects in
progress tended to become soft. Once a project had been selected for funding it
had a good chance of its funding being continued until aggregate limits on the
funding principals’ resources and patience were breached.
4. There was a cyclical aspect to the diffusion of jet propulsion R&D projects. At
first projects proliferated, so resource commitments grew and became dispersed.
At a certain point funding principals lost patience, terminated those projects
judged to be failing, and redirected funding to more limited priorities. Then, the
limitation of activity gave rise to unexploited opportunities, so new challenges to
central priorities and organisational monopolies emerged and designers’ lobbying
activity resumed.
5. It was difficult or impossible for the authorities to tell good ideas from bad ones.
It was difficult in advance because of technological uncertainty and discrepant
motivations. It was not much less difficult when projects were in progress
because projects could fail for reasons unrelated to the goodness of the original
idea. In the presence of sunk costs, refinancing a project in progress was usually
easier than terminating it. It is possible that adverse selection was the result.
6. Designers who were successful in getting their proposals selected for initial
funding and subsequent refinancing were “heterogeneous engineers”. They
invested resources in lobbying and political reputation to ensure that their projects
were selected for funding and, once selected, to protect them against termination
from above or takeover by rivals in the name of rationalisation.
7. When faced with adverse funding or career decisions or takeover threats
designers retained the option of appealing to higher instances in the vertical
hierarchy. The success of such appeals rested in part of reputation, but the
political element in reputations was fragile and it seems that appeals were rarely
successful.
8. The evidence suggests that the costs of Soviet R&D were inflated by rent–
seeking activity. Like other economic agents, design personnel overbid for
resources, concealed reserves, diverted surplus stocks to private use, and
exaggerated achievements for the sake of reward. The evidence that Stalin
distributed rents through the R&D system to reward loyalty is anecdotal; the
evidence also shows that rent–seeking was punished when detected.
9. The Soviet willingness to invest resources in military R&D in general reflected
the long–term character of Stalin’s motivation, plus the importance of tacit
knowledge produced at home to complement the explicit knowledge obtained
from abroad in limited quantities by various means though not, in the case of jet
propulsion, espionage.
Table 1. Major Soviet R&D projects for aeroengines based on jet propulsion and turbines, by establishment, 1932 to 1944
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941(1) 1941(2) 1942 1943 1944
Glushko rocket motor and aviation boosters–———————————————————————————————?
Rocket glider–———–? Rocket glider (also at
OSK zavoda no. 1) —–?
Ramjet ————————————————————————————–?
Hybrid jet engine with compressor——————–?
Dushkin–Isaev rocket motor —————–——————–——–?
Aviation rocket booster
GDL,
GIRD,
RNII,
NII–3,
GIRT,
NIIRA,
NII–1
Liul’ka
turbojet
(from
TsIAM)
Gas turbine Uvarov gas turbines ————————————–?VTI
Steam
turbine
Steam
turbine
MAI Gas turbine
Przhe–
slavskii
binary–
cycle steam
turbine
VVA Aksiutin steam turbine (continuing at Energet. inst.
and SKB) ————————————————–?
Energet.
institut
SKB
Aksiutin
steam
turbine
(from VVA) ————? Liul’ka turbojet ——————–—––?
Sinev steam turbine —?
KB–2 Kozhevnikov gas–steam turbine ———————–?
KhAI Tsvetkov steam turbine ——————————–––––––––––––?
NII GVF Steam
turbine
Continued.
Table 1 (continued).
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941(1) 1941(2) 1942 1943 1944
Z–d no. 18 Dybskii–Udod gas–steam
turbine ––––––––—––?
Steam turbines –———————––?
Merkulov
ramjet (also
at OSK
zavoda
no. 1)
TsKTI
Liul’ka
turbojet
KB–7 Ramjet Rocket
motor
Rocket glider (also at
NII–3) —————––?
OSK z–da
no. 1
Merkulov ramjet (also at TsKTI) —————–—–?
Z–d no. 28 Bas–Dubov–Zaslavskii
ramjet ——————–?
Uvarov gas turbine —–? Uvarov propjet ——––?
Liul’ka
turbojet
(also at
OKB–293,
continuing
at NII–1)
Fadeev–
Kholshch–
evnikov
hybrid jet
engine with
compressor
TsIAM
Tolstov
hybrid jet
engine with
compressor
Dushkin–Isaev rocket
motor (also at GIRT) –?
OKB–293
Liul’ka turbojet (also at
OKB–293, continuing at
NII–1) –——–––—––?
Continued.
Table 1 (continued).
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941(1) 1941(2) 1942 1943 1944
KB z–da
no. 16
Glushko rocket motor ––––––––––––?
Z–d no. 84 Merkulov
ramjet
TsAGI Abram–
ovich
hybrid jet
engine with
compressor
Source: Appendix A, supplemented by Egorov (1994), 424–36. The documentation supporting appendix A comprises plans, reports, and memoranda of the
People’s Commissariats of Defence, Internal Affairs, Heavy Industry, the Defence Industry, Ammunition, and the Aircraft Industry.
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Table 2. The number of major Soviet projects for aeroengines based on jet propulsion
and turbines, 1932 to 1944
Rocket motors Jet and turbine engines
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1932 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 –1 0
1933 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 2
1934 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 4 –1 3
1935 1 0 1 0 1 3 2 5 –2 3
1936 1 1 2 0 2 3 1 4 –1 3
1937 2 0 2 –1 1 3 5 8 –1 7
1938 1 0 1 0 1 7 1 8 –5 3
1939 1 2 3 –1 2 3 4 7 –3 4
1940 2 0 2 –2 0 4 0 4 0 4
1941(1) 0 1 1 0 1 4 2 6 0 6
1941(2) 1 1 2 0 2 6 0 6 –6 0
1942 2 0 2 –1 1 0 2 2 0 2
1943 1 1 2 0 2 2 2 4 –2 2
1944 2 0 2 .. .. 2 2 4 .. ..
Source: calculated from table 1. Column [1] = [5] in the previous year; [5] = [4] + [3];
[3] = [2] + [1].
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Table 3. Personnel of RNII–NII–3, by employment status: 1935 to 1941 (number of
persons, annual average)
1935 1936 1937
plan
1938 1939 1940 1941
plan
Engineering & technical
employees .. 102 118 .. .. .. 215
Manual employees .. 196 295 .. .. .. 385
Nonmanual employees 76 84 88 .. .. .. ..
¾ accounting & clerical .. .. .. .. .. .. 125
¾ production & planning .. .. .. .. .. .. 79
Junior service personnel 37 64 63 .. .. .. 32
Total 403 446 476 514 799 .. 836
Source: 1935 from RGAE, 8162/1/16, 16, and 1936–7 from ibid., 4 (no date but about
February 1937); 1938–9 from RGAE, 8162/1/240, 32 (13 January 1940); 1941 from
RGAE, 8162/1/449, 144 (18 November 1941).
Table 4. The research institutes and design bureaux of the thirteenth chief
administration of the People’s Commissariat of Ammunition, 1938
Budget,
thou. rubles
Planned
research
topics
Scientific
workers
NII–24 12 764 178 60
—Leningrad filial 11 052 81 55
KB–47 8 006 94 55
NII–3 5 667 39 44
KB–7 1 200 9 13
KB–31 700 6 19
Total 39 389 407 246
Source: RGAE, 8162/1/299, 9 (no date but 1938).
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Appendix A. Soviet R&D Projects for Aeroengines Based on
Jet Propulsion and Turbines Listed in Ministerial Plans and
Reports, 1932 to 1944
Year Date Design
organisation
Designer Design object
1932 4 July GDL Glushko Rocket motor
1932 4 July VTI .. Gas turbine
1933 27 Jan. VVA Aksiutin Steam turbine
1933 5 Dec. KB–2 Kozhevnikov Gas–steam turbine
1934 23 Jan. RNII (former
GDL)
.. Aviation boosters
1934 23 Jan. RNII (former
GIRD)
.. Rocket motors
1934 29 Jan. KhAI .. Steam turbine
1934 10 May MAI .. GT–1 gas turbine
1934 4 July KB–2 Kozhevnikov Gas–steam turbine
1935 16 April KhAI .. Air–naval steam turbine
PT–6
1935 16 April NII GVF .. Air–naval steam turbine
PT–3
1935 16 April VTI .. Air–naval steam turbine
1936 Dec. VTI .. GT–1 gas turbine
1936 8 Jan. VTI .. GT–1 gas turbine
1936 19 Jan. KB–2 Kozhevnikov Gas–steam turbine
1936 28 April RNII .. Rocket glider
1936 22 Aug. VVA Aksiutin Steam turbine
1936 Dec. RNII .. Ramjet
1936 Dec. RNII .. Liquid–fuelled aviation
rocket motor
1936 Dec. RNII .. Rocket glider
1937 .. RNII .. Rocket glider
1937 28 Feb. Energet. institut
SKB
Aksiutin Steam turbine PT–1
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Year Date Design
organisation
Designer Design object
1937 28 Feb. KhAI Tsvetkov Steam turbine PT–6
1937 28 Feb. MAI
VTI
Przheslavskii Binary–cycle turbine
1937 28 Feb. TsKTI .. Turbine “S”
1937 28 Feb. VTI Uvarov Gas turbines GTU–3, GTU–
5
1937 11 June Energet. institut
SKB
Aksiutin Steam turbine PT–1
1937 11 June KhAI Tsvetkov Steam turbine PT–6
1937 11 June MAI
VTI
.. Binary–cycle turbine
1937 11 June TsKTI .. Turbine “S”
1937 1 Dec. KhAI Tsvetkov Steam turbine PT–6
1937 1 Dec. MAI
VTI
Przheslavskii Binary–cycle turbine
1937 1 Dec. SKB Sinev Steam turbine
1937 1 Dec. TsKTI Laditskii
Fimin
..
1937 27 Dec. KhAI Gindez
Lozino–Lozinskii
..
1937 27 Dec. MAI Kvasnikov ..
1937 27 Dec. Z–d no. 18 Dybskii–Udod Steam turbine
1938 1 Jan. Z–d no. 18 Dybskii–Udod Steam turbine
1938 Feb. KhAI .. Steam turbine
1938 Feb. SKB .. Steam turbine
1938 Feb. VTI .. Steam turbine
1938 4 Feb. KB–7 .. Ramjet
1938 4 Feb. NII–3 .. Ramjet
1938 3 May TsKTI .. Steam turbines VT–1,
VTK–100, VTK–3000
1938 9 Dec. VTI Uvarov Gas turbine GTU–3
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Year Date Design
organisation
Designer Design object
1939 .. KB–7 .. Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
1939 .. NII–3 .. Rocket glider RP–318
1939 9 April NII–3 .. Ramjet
1939 4 June KB–7 .. Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
1939 4 June NII–3 .. Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
1939 4 June TsKTI .. Steam turbines PT–1M,
VTK–300
1939 4 June VTI .. Gas turbine
1939 20 Oct. NII–3 Rocket glider
1939 10 Dec. .. Uvarov Gas turbine
1939 10 Dec. .. .. Steam turbines
1939 10 Dec. TsKTI Liul’ka
Merkulov
Air jets
1940 13 Jan. NII–3 .. Rocket glider
Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
1940 17 Sept. NII–3 Rocket glider
Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
1941 14 Jan. NII–3 .. Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
1941 20 Mar. TsIAM Uvarov Gas turbine GTU–3
1941 5 Feb.;
5 Apr.
z–d no. 1 Merkulov ..
1941 5 Feb.;
5 Apr.
z–d no. 28 Bas–Dubov
Zaslavskii
..
1941 5 Feb.;
5 Apr.
NII–3 .. Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
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Year Date Design
organisation
Designer Design object
1941 5 Feb.;
5 Apr.
SKB–1 Liul’ka Axial turbojet
1941 12 Apr. NII–3 .. Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
for interceptor aircraft
1941 30 July NII–3 .. Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
for interceptor aircraft
1941 7 Aug. NII–3 .. Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
for interceptor aircraft
1941 30 Dec. NII–3 .. Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
for interceptor aircraft
Rocket booster
1942 5 Jan. NII–3 ..
1942 4 May NII–3 .. Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
for interceptor aircraft
Rocket booster
1942 7 May NII–3 .. Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
1942 29 May NII–3 .. Ramjet
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
Rocket interceptor aircraft
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Year Date Design
organisation
Designer Design object
1942 8 June OKB–293 Bolkhovitinov
Dushkin
Liul’ka
BI fighter with liquid–
fuelled rocket motor
1942 10 Aug. OKB–293 Liul’ka Turbojet
1943 20 May TsIAM Liul’ka Turbojet
1943 22 Oct. z–d no. 84 Merkulov Ramjet
1943 22 Oct. GIRT .. Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
for BI
1943 22 Oct. KB z–da no. 16 Glushko Liquid–fuelled rocket motor
1943 22 Oct. OKB–293 Bolkhovitinov BI fighter with liquid–
fuelled rocket motor
1943 22 Oct. TsAGI Abramovich Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
1943 22 Oct. TsIAM Liul’ka
Uvarov
Turbojets
1944 .. KB z–da no. 16 Glushko Rocket motor
1944 .. NII–3 Dushkin
Isaev
Rocket motors
1944 .. NIIRA Liul’ka Turbojet
1944 .. TsIAM Fadeev
Kholshchevnikov
Tolstov
Hybrid jet engine with
compressor
1944 .. TsIAM Uvarov Propjet
1944 16 July KB z–da no. 16 Glushko Rocket motor RD–1
Sources: GARF, 9401/2/65, 385; RGAE, 7516/1/309, 15; RGAE, 7516/1/318, 42–56;
RGAE, 7516/1/319, 1–36; RGAE, 8044/1/460, 59, 104; RGAE, 8044/1/613, 172;
RGAE, 8044/1/817, 18; RGAE, 8044/1/829, 235–242, ; RGAE, 8044/1/984, 253–258;
RGAE, 8044/1/985, 73–76; RGAE, 8044/1/994, 21–23, ; RGAE, 8044/1/1182, 77–
78, 81–84; RGAE, 8159/1/6, 74; RGAE, 8159/1/137, 2–28; RGAE, 8159/1/140, 12–
15; RGAE, 8162/1/89, 101; RGAE, 8162/1/240, 55–58; RGAE, 8162/1/300, 65–66,
80–81; RGAE, 8162/1/448, 7, 9; RGAE, 8162/1/449, 16–20, 96–7, 180–1; RGAE,
8162/1/574, 20, 24–26, 38–40, 85, 101; RGAE, 8328/1/696, 25, 133; RGAE,
8328/1/824, 1–50; RGAE, 8328/1/919, 84; RGAE, 8328/1/992, 6–7; RGAE,
8328/1/995, 106; RGAE, 8328/1/996, 16–18, 22–23ob; RGVA, 34272/1/167, 23–24,
47–55, 102–119; RGVA, 4/14/1171, 33, 36; RGVA, 4/14/1925, 21; RGVA,
4/14/2800, 4.
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Appendix B. Key to Design Institutions
Energet. institut (Energeticheskii institut AN SSSR): Institute of Energetics of the
USSR Academy of Sciences
GDL (Gazo–Dinamicheskaia laboratoriia UVI RKKA): Gas Dynamics Laboratory of
the Administration of Military Inventions of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army
GIRD (Gruppa po Izucheniiu Reaktivnoi Dvizheniia pri TsS Osoaviakhima): Group
for the Study of Jet Propelled Motion of the Central Council of the Society for
Cooperation in Air and Chemical Defence
GIRT (Gosudarstvennyi Institut Reaktivnoi Tekhniki pri SNK SSSR): State Institute
for Jet Propulsion Technology of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars
KB zavoda no. 16 (Konstruktorskoe biuro 4–ogo spetsotdela NKVD zavoda no. 16
NKAP): design Bureau of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs Fourth
Special Department at factory no. 16 of the People’s Commissariat of the Aircraft
Industry, Kazan’ (in other words, an NKVD sharaga)
KB–2 (Konstruktorskoe biuro no. 2 UVI RKKA): design bureau no. 2 of the
Administration of Military Inventions of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army
KB–7 (Konstruktorskoe biuro no. 7 UVI RKKA, later NKOP–NKB): design bureau
no. 7 of the Administration of Military Inventions of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red
Army, later of the People’s Commissariat of the Defence Industry (later Ammunition)
KhAI (Khar’kovskii Aviatsionnyi institut NKTP–NKOP–NKAP): Kharkov Aviation
Institute of the People’s Commissiat of Heavy Industry (later Defence Industry, later
Aircraft Industry)
MAI (Moskovskii Aviatsionnyi institut NKTP–NKOP–NKAP): Moscow Aviation
Institute of the People’s Commissiat of Heavy Industry (later Defence Industry, later
Aircraft Industry)
NII GVF (Nauchno–Issledovatel’skii institut Grazhdansko–Vozdushnogo Flota
GUGVF SNK): Research Institute of the Civil Air Fleet of the Chief Administration
of the Civil Air Fleet of the Council of People’s Commissars
NII–1 (Nauchno–Issledovatel’skii institut no. 1 NKAP): research institute no. 3 of the
People’s Commissiat of the Aircraft Industry
NII–3 (Nauchno–Issledovatel’skii institut no. 3 NKOP–NKB): research institute no.
3 of the People’s Commissiat of the Defence Industry (later Ammunition)
NIIRA (Nauchno–Issledovatel’skii institut Reaktivnoi Aviatsii NKAP): Research
Institute for Jet–Propelled Aviation of the People’s Commissariat of the Aircraft
Industry
OKB–293 (Opytno–konstruktorskoe biuro zavoda no. 293 NKAP): experimental
design bureau no. 293 of the People’s Commissariat of the Aircraft Industry
45
OSK z–da no. 1 (otdel spetsial’nykh konstruktsii zavoda no. 1 NKAP): department
of special–purpose designs of factory no. 1 of the People’s Commissariat of the
Aircraft Industry
RNII (Reaktivnyi Nauchno–Issledovatel’skii institut NKTP): Jet Propulsion Research
Institute of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry
SKB , later SKB–1 (Spetsial’noe konstruktorskoe Pervogo glavnogo upravleniia
NKOP): Special–purpose Design Bureau of the First Chief Administration of the
People’s Commissariat of the Defence Industry
TsAGI (Tsentral’nyi Aero–Gidrodinamicheskii institut NKTP–NKOP–NKAP):
Central Aero–Hydrodynamic Institute of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy
Industry (later the Defence Industry, later the Aircraft Industry)
TsIAM (Tsentral’nyi Institut Aviationnogo Motorostroeniia NKTP–NKOP–NKAP):
Central Institute for Aeroengine Building of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy
Industry (later the Defence Industry, later the Aircraft Industry)
TsKTI (Tsentral’nyi Kotlo–turbinnyi institut Energoproma NKTP): Central Boiler
and Turbine Institute of the Electricity Supply Industry Administration of the
People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry (Leningrad)
VTI (Vsesoiuznyi Teplotekhnicheskii institut im. Dzerzhinskogo NKTP):
Dzerzhinskii All–Union Thermal–Technical Institute of the Electricity Supply
Industry Administration of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry
VVA (Voenno–Vozdushnaia Akademiia RKKA): Air Force Academy of the
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army
z–d no. 18 (zavod no. 28 NKOP): factory no. 18 of the People’s Commissariat of the
Defence (later Aircraft) Industry
z–d no. 28 (zavod no. 28 NKAP): factory no. 28 of the People’s Commissariat of the
Aircraft Industry
z–d no. 84 (zavod no. 84 NKAP): factory no. 84 of the People’s Commissariat of the
Aircraft Industry
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Figure B–1. The evolutionary path of RNII, 1932 to 1944
Sources and notes: see next page.
GDL UVI RKKA
Gas Dynamics Laboratory of the
Red Army Administration for
Military Inventions (Leningrad)
GIRD UVI RKKA
Group for the Study of Jet–Propelled
Motion of the Red Army
Administration for Military Inventions
RNII NKTP
Jet Propulsion Research Institute of the
People’s commissariat for Heavy Industry
January 1937
NII–3 NKOP
Research Institute no. 3 of the People’s
Commissariat for the Defence Industry
NII–3 NKB
Research Institute no. 3 of the People’s
Commissariat for Ammunition
December 1938
GIRT pri SNK SSSR
State Institute for Jet Propulsion Technology of the
USSR Council of People’s Commissars
NIIRA NKAP
Research Institute for Jet–Propelled Aviation of the
People’s Commissariat for the Aircraft Industry
NII–1 NKAP
Research Institute No. 1 of the People’s
Commissariat for the Aircraft Industry
OKB–293 NKAP
Experimental Design Bureau of Factory no.
293 of the People’s Commissariat for the
Aircraft Industry, Khimki, Moscow oblast’
August 1935
January 1942
February 1944
May 1944
KB–7 AU RKKA
Design Bureau no. 7 of the Red
Army Artillery Administration
KB–7 NKOP
Design Bureau no. 7 of the People’s
Commissariat for the Defence Industry
January 1938
KB–7 NKB
Design Bureau no. 7 of the People’s
Commissariat for Ammunition
December 1938
January 1934
GIRD pri TsS Osoaviakhima
Group for the Study of Jet–Propelled Motion of the
Central Council of the Society for Cooperation in Air
and Chemical Defence
October 1933
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Sources and notes to figure B–1. For most details see Siddiqi (2000), 1–18.
Additionally, while GIRD was originally sponsored by Osoaviakhim, a memorandum
of 23 January 1934 notes that it was taken over by UVI RKKA in October 1933
before being merged with GDL, renamed RNII, and transferred to NKTP (RGVA
4/14/1171, 33). Siddiqi states that NII–3 was handed over to NKB in November
1937, but this commissariat was only created with the dissolution of NKOP in
December 1938. Various documents indicate that NKB also acquired KB–7 from the
Red Army’s artillery administration at the beginning of 1938. A memorandum from
deputy defence commissar Fed’ko to Molotov dated 15 February 1938 refers to “the
former KB no. 7 AU RKKA, transferred to NKOP” (RGVA, 4/14/1925, 22), and
KB–7 is listed among the establishments of the NKB thirteenth chief administration
in its report of work for the year 1938 (RGAE, 8162/1/89, 101). KB–7 was apparently
dissolved in 1939. GIRT is described as “pri SNK SSSR” in its deed of transfer to
NKAP, not dated but of 1944 (RGAE, 8044/1/1182, 11–16). All establishments were
located in Moscow unless otherwise noted.
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Appendix C. Income and Expenditure of NII–3: 1936 and
1937 Plan (Thousand Rubles)
1936 (report) 1937 (plan)
Income
From the USSR state budget
—under §53 1 980.0 2 080.0
—for staff training 11.4 57.0
From contracts with other organisations 1 385.0 2 300.0
From sale of surplus stores 15.0 75.0
From liquidation of assets 8.6 0.0
Other income and revenues 20.0 50.0
Total 3 420.0 4 482.0 a
Continued.
49
Appendix C (continued)
1936 (report) 1937 (plan)
Expenditure
I. On research in departments and laboratories of the institute
A. Direct expenditures
—Wages 633.0 858.0
—Wage supplements 83.0 102.8
—Work done by other organisations 282.0 300.0
—Other direct expenditures 1497.0 1857.4
B. Institutional expenditures
—Wages 83.0
—Wage supplements 10.0
—Other institutional expenditures
ü
ý
þ
193.0
290.1
C. Administrative expenditures
—Wages 389.0
—Wage supplements 46.7
—Travel costs (komandirovki) 47.0
—Other administrative expenditures
ü
ý
þ
575.0
441.0
Subtotal, section I 3268.0 b 4425.0
— less Internal procurement –1303.0 –2085.0
II. Auxiliary, experimental, and sideline production
A. Direct expenditures
—Wages 556.0 1057.0
—Wage supplements 72.0 126.8
—Other direct expenditures 341.0 337.5
B. Working expenditures
—Wages 210.0
—Wage supplements 25.3
—Other working expenditures
ü
ý
þ
253.0
224.2
C. Administrative expenditures
—Wages 197.0
—Wage supplements 23.6
—Other administrative expenditures
ü
ý
þ
175.0
15.6
Subtotal, section II 1397.0 2217.0
— less Internal procurement –94.0 –132.0
III. Special–purpose expenditures not included in research costs
—Staff training 15.0 57.0
Total, sections I, II, and III 3377.0 c 4482.0
Source: RGAE, 8162/1/16, 2–3 (28 February 1937). All expenditure section subtotals
are gross, including expenditures on the institute’s own provision of in–sourced
materials. The supply of these is covered in section II. Thus gross expenditures under
section II equal the total of internal procurements to be subtracted from gross outlays
under each of sections I, II, and III in order to calculate the bottom–line expenditure
total for the institute as a whole. Some column subtotals are given incorrectly;
corrected sums are as follows:
a 4562.0 thousand rubles (also handwritten in the original by the typed sum)
b 3268.0 thousand rubles.
c 3283.0 thousand rubles.
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